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The purpose of the study was to examine the influence of feedback regarding 
personal and group performance on children’s views of (a) themselves (e.g., state self-
esteem), (b) their ingroup and outgroup (e.g., trait stereotyping), and (c) novel tasks (e.g., 
task liking). In addition, moderating effects of age and individual difference variables 
(self-esteem, conformity orientation, and entity/incremental theory of personality) on the 
relation between self and group views were examined.
Theorists have offered differing accounts of the causal mechanisms that underlie 
relations between views of the self and social groups. Self-verification theorists have 
argued that perceptions of the self drive individuals’ views of, and attitudes toward, their 
groups. In contrast, self-categorization theorists argue that membership in groups causes 
individuals to perceive themselves in ways that are consistent with perceptions or 
stereotypes of the group. However, membership in many social groups (e.g., gender, 
racial, ethnic groups) is not freely chosen. What happens when individuals’ views of 
themselves differ from their perceptions of their ingroups or the prevailing stereotypes 
about their ingroups? 
To address this question, children (N = 120, ages 7-12) attending a summer school 
program were randomly assigned a novel social group membership. As in other research 




organize the classroom. Over the course of several weeks, children completed three novel 
tasks and received feedback indicating that their performance was either excellent or 
mediocre and their ingroup’s performance was either excellent or mediocre. Thus, there 
were four conditions: personal performance excellent, group performance excellent 
(positive verifying); personal performance excellent, group performance mediocre 
(overachieving); personal performance mediocre, group performance excellent 
(underachieving); and personal performance mediocre, group performance mediocre 
(negative verifying). Effects of condition on self-perceptions, views of the tasks, and 
intergroup attitudes were then assessed. 
Results indicated effects of personal and group feedback on children’s task 
evaluations, ingroup identification, and intergroup attitudes. There was stronger evidence 
for main effects of feedback type than for interaction effects of feedback consistency 
versus inconsistency. Results are discussed in light of self-categorization, self-
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Introduction and Literature Review 
Introduction 
 There is widespread agreement that social group memberships have profound 
influences on individuals’ personal identities, attitudes, and behaviors (Phinney, Cantu, & 
Kurtz, 1997; Steele, 1997). At the same time, there is strong consensus that individuals’ 
personal qualities and behaviors have an influence on their own – and others’ – views of 
the groups to which they belong. Little work, however, has attempted to examine the 
interface of these two processes. The purpose of the current study was to examine the 
effects of children’s self views on their views of social groups, and the reciprocal effects 
of views concerning social groups on children’s views of the self. Of particular interest 
are the outcomes for individuals when their views of themselves conflict with their own 
and others’ views of the groups to which they belong.  
Self-Socialization Views 
Researchers have long hypothesized that children’s perceptions of the 
characteristics (e.g., traits, activities, roles) associated with their social groups can affect 
their views of themselves. Social stereotypes are generally well known by members of a 
society, even those individuals who do not personally endorse such stereotypes (Devine, 
1989). Importantly, children are knowledgeable about culturally shared views of many 
social groups (e.g., race, gender) by the time they begin elementary school (e.g., Aboud, 
1988; Ruble & Martin, 1998). So, for example, the vast majority of girls acquire the 
knowledge that girls are viewed as less talented at math than boys. Many theorists have 




A variety of specific mechanisms by which social identities influence behavior 
have been proposed. Some researchers (e.g., Eccles, Wigfield, Harold, & Blumenfeld, 
1993; Jacobs, 1991) have emphasized environmental influences, such stereotyping by 
parents and teachers, on children’s outcomes. Other researchers (e.g., Bussey & Bandura, 
1992; Crocker & Major, 1989; Fredricks & Eccles, 2002; Martin & Halverson, 1991) 
have emphasized the role of internal influences, such as the internalization of stereotypes 
and group values. Bussey and Bandura’s (1999) model posits that children learn to 
engage in “appropriate” behavior for their group via direct teaching, reinforcement, and 
imitation of models in the environment. These authors argue that children create a set of 
personal behavior standards based on the ingroup models they have observed and that, 
over time, children increasingly use these standards to regulate their own behavior 
(Bussey & Bandura, 1992). For example, Bandura (1990) argued that ingroup models 
“…inspire others by strengthening beliefs in their capabilities to succeed, lead them to try 
things they would otherwise shun, and bolster their staying power in the face of obstacles 
(p. 352).” 
Self-categorization theory, like its predecessor, social identity theory (Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), posits that social group 
membership forms an important basis of identity and source of self-esteem (Hogg, 1996). 
According to SCT, the desire to identify with a valuable group and achieve positive self 
views leads individuals to adopt the ingroup’s values, perceive other ingroup members to 
be similar to themselves, and show ingroup biases in attitudes and behavior (Turner, 




Hogg, 1996) argue that individuals “self-stereotype” or see themselves in ways that are 
consistent with their views of the groups to which they belong. 
Consistent with these views, researchers have shown that individuals’ views of 
themselves and their competencies are linked to social group membership. Eccles and 
colleagues, for example, have shown that children’s and adults’ beliefs about their 
competence in, and valuing of, domains such as sports, mathematics, and reading are 
linked to gender (Eccles et al., 1993; Fredricks & Eccles, 2002). Ethnic background has 
also been linked to children’s valuing of academic and non-academic domains (e.g., 
Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998; Crocker & Major, 1989). 
Mahalingam and Ruble (2005), for example, reported that Asian American children who 
endorse positive academic stereotypes about their ethnic groups are more likely than 
children who do not endorse these stereotypes to express anxiety about their own 
academic performance. In addition, Wood et al. (1997) found that individuals had more 
positive affect and felt themselves to be closer to their ideal selves when they behaved in 
a way that was consistent with sex-typed social norms. 
Self-Verification Views 
In contrast to self-socialization views, self-verification theorists (Swann & Read, 
1981; Swann, Polzer, Seyle, & Ko, 2004) have argued that perceptions of the self drive 
individuals’ views of, and attitudes toward, their groups. Having one’s self-views 
confirmed is thought to give one a sense of security and a feeling that one is able to 
predict the behaviors of others (Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & Geisler, 1992). Conversely, 
having one’s self views disconfirmed (i.e., having others view one differently than one 




themselves positively will seek out groups that view them positively or provide positive 
feedback, whereas individuals who view themselves negatively will prefer groups that 
view them negatively or provide negative feedback. Once individuals belong to groups, 
those whose groups confirm their self views should feel more connected to their group 
than those whose groups do not confirm their self views (Swann, Milton, & Polzer, 
2000).  
Other theorists have also argued that individuals form expectations for their 
ingroups based on their knowledge of themselves and evaluate ingroups based on 
similarity to the self (i.e., they use the self as an informational base; Gramzow, Gaertner, 
& Sedikides, 2001). Gramzow et al. (2001) also argued that individuals engage in 
information-processing strategies that preserve these expectations. Consistent with these 
predictions, Gramzow et al. (2001) found that individuals showed greater memory for 
negative feedback about the ingroup when the feedback was self-consistent than when it 
was self-inconsistent. More recently, Gramzow and Gaertner (2005) conducted a series of 
studies examining the role of general self-esteem on the evaluation of ingroups (i.e., the 
self as an evaluative base). Gramzow and Gaertner found links between positive personal 
self-esteem and favorable ingroup evaluations, even when information provided indicated 
that the ingroup was objectively worse than the outgroup. 
Relatively little research has been conducted on self-verification processes with 
children. Several studies (Bandura, 1990; Cassidy, Aikins, & Chernoff, 2003; Cassidy, 
Ziv, Mehta, & Feeney, 2003) indicate, however, that self-verification processes operate in 
childhood. Bandura’s (1990) study found that children ignored feedback that could 




that domain. Cassidy et al. (2003) reported that third-grade children preferred to interact 
with a self-verifying partner when asked about specific domains (e.g., if they viewed 
themselves as unskilled at sports, they preferred to interact with a partner who also 
viewed them as unskilled at sports). However, in the area of global self-views, children 
preferred a self-enhancing partner (i.e., children preferred a partner who viewed them 
positively overall), regardless of whether they viewed themselves positively or negatively 
overall.  
Integrating Self and Group Views 
Some children may independently acquire self and group views that are entirely 
consistent (e.g., a boy who believes himself and other males to be good at math). Other 
children, however, may develop preferences (e.g., activity interests) or skills (e.g., 
academic talents) that conflict with their own or others’ views of their group. So, for 
example, a girl may think of herself as highly skilled at math prior to learning the cultural 
stereotype that females are less skilled at math than males. What will this new knowledge 
mean for her self and group views? 
Swann and colleagues (e.g., Swann, 1987; Swann, et al., 2000) argue that 
individuals engage in a process of identity negotiation in which they attempt to reconcile 
their views of themselves with others’ views of them. Identity negotiation can result in 
either self-verification effects (in which the group’s views change in accord with the 
individual’s self views) or appraisal effects (in which the individual’s views become 
more similar to group members’ perceptions). In research with small groups, Swann and 
colleagues (2000) found evidence for both self-verification and appraisal processes. 




feelings of connection to the group. Conversely, resolving identity negotiation issues in 
favor of appraisal was related to better group performance on tasks that required group 
members to agree on a single solution.  
Importantly, identity negotiation processes related to social group membership 
will likely differ from those involved with interpersonal relationships or small group 
membership, in part because individuals are far less able to change social group-based 
expectations (e.g., stereotypes) for the self. Evidence for one way in which group 
members might deal with verifying versus non-verifying social group memberships 
comes from a study by Pittinsky, Shih, and Ambady (1999). These researchers argued 
that individuals will orient themselves toward the group memberships which are most 
adaptive in a given context. In their study, Pittinsky et al. (1999) found that individuals 
showed more positive affect toward an identity that was adaptive (e.g., an Asian identity 
when taking a mathematics test) than toward an identity that was non-adaptive (e.g., an 
Asian identity when taking a test of verbal ability). 
 An additional theory relevant to issues of integrating self and group views is 
Brewer’s (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory, which posits that individuals desire to 
feel both similar to others and unique and distinct from others. Brewer argues that one 
way in which individuals maintain feelings of optimal distinctiveness is through 
membership in and identification with social groups. Brewer predicts that group members 
who feel overly distinctive (atypical) will increase their ingroup identification in an 





Support for Brewer’s model comes from studies that manipulate adults’ sense of 
typicality. Pickett, Bonner, and Coleman (2002), for example, found that participants who 
were told they were different from ingroup members (a threat to ingroup assimilation) 
stated that they personally possessed typical ingroup characteristics more often than 
participants who were told that they were similar to ingroup members. The authors 
interpreted the findings as indicating that atypicality produces increased ingroup 
identification. Pickett and Brewer (2001) have also found support for the assertion that 
assimilation needs increase the need for intergroup contrast and lead to increased 
perception of differences between ingroup and outgroup. 
Another recent study (Oyserman, Brickman, Bybee, & Celious, 2006) provided 
additional support for optimal distinctiveness theory. This study indicates that being 
atypical of the social group in one respect may lead individuals to strive to be typical of 
their ingroups in other respects, even when this means confirming negative stereotypes. 
Oyserman et al. (2006) evaluated the academic performance of African American and 
Latino teenagers and found that boys who were physically atypical of their ingroup (i.e., 
light-skinned African Americans and Latinos who perceived themselves as looking less 
Latino) were less academically successful than their more typical-looking peers. 
Oyserman et al. concluded that boys who looked atypical of their group may have striven 
to conform to negative academic stereotypes of their group as a way of feeling similar to 
or included with the group, whereas boys who looked more typical felt sufficiently 
similar to the ingroup based on physical appearance and thus felt freer to be atypical in 




A growing body of research suggests the existence of negative consequences 
resulting from being an “atypical” group member (e.g., Crick, 1997; Egan & Perry, 2001; 
Olweus, 1992; Smith & Leaper, 2006). One consequence concerns peer acceptance 
versus rejection. Research indicates that children show a preference for ingroup members 
who conform to group norms over ingroup members who violate group norms (by, for 
example, associating with outgroup members). Studies have found that, with age, 
children increasingly consider individuating factors such as loyalty or conformity to 
group norms in addition to group membership when making evaluations of ingroup and 
outgroup members (e.g., Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003). Specifically, Abrams et 
al. found that, when asked about ingroup and outgroup members who displayed deviant 
behavior (in this case, equal preference for the English and German soccer teams, relative 
to the normative behavior of favoring one’s own country’s team), children preferred 
normative ingroup members to deviant ingroup members, but deviant outgroup members 
to normative outgroup members. Children also showed a preference for deviant outgroup 
members over deviant ingroup members. In addition, older children were more likely 
than younger children to predict that deviant group members would be rejected by their 
peers. 
 Although research with children and adults indicates that atypical group members 
are less well liked than typical group members, little research has examined the effects of 
atypicality of the self on individuals’ intergroup attitudes. There are theoretical grounds 
to support two conflicting outcomes. The first possible outcome is that children who are 
atypical might value their group membership more strongly than typical group members 




similarity, and ingroup bias. This view is consistent with self-categorization theory 
(Turner et al., 1987) and optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991). Because atypical 
children may have a less secure sense of attachment to the group (and consequently a 
threatened sense of pride and self-esteem) they may have to work especially hard to 
maintain their connection to the group. Indeed, threat has been found to increase ingroup 
bias (Cameron, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde, 2005). Thus, atypical children would be 
expected to show stronger ingroup identities and higher levels of ingroup bias than 
typical children. 
The second possible outcome is that children who are atypical of their group 
might value their group membership less strongly than children who are typical of their 
group and, as a consequence, show a weakened psychological sense of belongingness, 
lower perceptions of similarity to the group, and reduced ingroup bias. Because atypical 
children are likely to view themselves as differing from their ingroup to a greater degree 
than typical children, they may be less likely to extend their self views to other ingroup 
members. Support for this notion comes from work with biracial children indicating that 
perceived physiognomy influences their ethnic identity. Specifically, Brunsma and 
Rockquemore (2001) found that biracial children tended to identify more strongly with 
the racial group that they believed themselves to resemble most closely. Evidence for 
reduced ingroup bias among atypical children also comes from work on gender. Dinella 
and Martin (2003) found that girls who identified themselves as tomboys endorsed fewer 
gender stereotypes than other girls. These findings indicate a possible reduction in group 




Limitations of Extant Work 
Researchers have posited two clear pathways through which self and group views 
might be integrated, one in which the self dominates and one in which the group 
dominates. There is empirical support for the operation of both pathways for many 
specific identities (e.g., race, gender). The complexity of naturally occurring social group 
memberships, however, leads to difficulty in isolating specific causal influences. That is, 
it is often impossible to determine which of the numerous factors associated with any 
particular group membership are responsible for producing group differences in 
outcomes. Individuals’ gender, race, and ethnicity covary with an enormous number of 
variables, including socioeconomic status, education levels, residential neighborhood 
characteristics, and reinforcement histories. For these reasons, experimental studies that 
involve the creation and manipulation of novel social identities may be useful for 
understanding the mechanisms that link gender, race, and ethnicity to children’s behavior. 
Perspectives from Intergroup Research 
Intergroup research paradigms involve the assignment of participants to novel 
social groups in order to examine the effects of group membership and environmental 
factors on a given outcome (e.g., Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). In 
addition to documenting a host of information processing and evaluative biases (for 
reviews, see Brewer & Brown, 1998; Messick & Mackie, 1989), intergroup paradigms 
have been used to test theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the mechanisms 
underlying the formation of stereotypes and prejudice. Such paradigms have advantages 
over correlational approaches in that they allow for a test of the causal role of various 




environmental messages about groups can be tightly controlled (e.g., presented to some 
individuals and not others), and the consequent effects on individuals’ social identities 
and attitudes observed.  
Developmental psychologists have applied such paradigms to the study of 
children’s social identities and attitudes (e.g., Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; Nesdale & 
Flesser, 2001; Yee & Brown, 1992). A recent paper by Bigler and Liben (2006) presented 
a number of studies of the development of ingroup bias in children and integrated these 
studies into a broad developmental intergroup theory. In developmental research using 
intergroup paradigms, researchers have typically given children messages (explicit or 
implicit) about their group’s performance on a specific task or measure of ability, and 
then asked children to evaluate their ingroup, outgroups, or themselves (Bigler, Brown, & 
Markell, 2001; Yee & Brown, 1992). For example, Nesdale and Flesser (2001) randomly 
placed children into high or low status groups ostensibly based on drawing ability. That 
is, they explicitly told children that, based on their drawing ability, they were being 
placed within a group of “excellent drawers” or “good drawers.”  Such studies have not, 
however, examined the effects of the match between children’s own traits (e.g., drawing 
ability) and those of their ingroup. 
A recent study by Bigler, Patterson, and Swann (2004) that manipulated both self 
and group view revealed complex relations among messages about group views, 
typicality, and intergroup attitudes. The authors used a novel group paradigm in which 
children wore colored t-shirts to indicate their group membership and teachers labeled 
and used the color groups in the classroom. Before being assigned to novel groups, 




domains. Immediately after being assigned to groups, children reported on the perceived 
competencies of their ingroups and outgroups, allowing for a test of whether children 
projected their self-conceptions onto their ingroup. Posters were then hung in the 
classrooms that depicted one color group as the winners of all the school’s academic 
contests and the other color group as the winners of all the school’s athletic contests. 
After six weeks, children were again asked to report their academic and athletic self-
competence, as well as the academic and athletic competence and general traits of the 
color groups.  
Overall, children showed a tendency to project their self views onto their ingroup 
(but not outgroup). Furthermore, children whose self views were confirmed by the 
posters (e.g., children who perceived themselves to be highly competent in the academic 
domain and saw that their ingroup won all of the academic contests) were significantly 
more content with their group membership than children whose self views were not 
confirmed. Children’s levels of intergroup bias did not, however, vary as a function of 
self-confirmation; all children showed evidence of ingroup bias. This study provides a 
promising method for examining the effects of self and group views on children’s 
attitudes and behavior. The interpretation of the study’s findings is limited, however, by 
the fact that children’s self views were already well-established at the start of the 
experiment and thus fairly resistant to experimental manipulation.  
The present study attempted to extend and expand upon previous research by 
manipulating information that children receive about personal and group abilities in an 
unfamiliar domain. The purpose of the study was twofold. The first goal was to examine 




specific tasks. The second goal was to examine the consequences of repeated exposure to 
information about one’s own performance and the performance of one’s group that is 
consistent or inconsistent. That is, children learned either that they were typical group 
members (i.e., they performed in a manner (either well or poorly) that was consistent 
with their group) or atypical group members (i.e., they performed in a manner that was 
inconsistent with their group).  
The study employed a novel group paradigm. Children were assigned to novel 
social groups (“red” and “blue” groups marked by colored t-shirts). Following their 
assignment to groups, children were given information about their own abilities and those 
of the novel social groups (i.e., competence on a novel task). Specifically, I examined the 
influence of information regarding personal and group performance on children’s views 
of (a) themselves, (b) their ingroup and outgroup, and (c) a relevant domain (i.e., an 
unfamiliar cognitive task). In addition, the study examined the role of several individual 
and developmental differences as potential moderators of the relations between self and 
group views. 
Individual Differences 
The first individual difference variable of interest is whether an individual 
endorses an entity or incremental theory of personality (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Erdley 
& Dweck, 1993). Individuals who endorse an entity theory of personality believe that 
behavior is primarily caused by an individual’s fixed traits and abilities. In contrast, 
individuals who endorse an incremental theory of personality believe that behavior is 
context-dependent and that people can change if they wish. Incremental theorists are 




entity theorists (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Henderson & Dweck, 1990). Furthermore, 
teaching incremental theories of intelligence can improve adolescents’ classroom 
motivation and academic performance (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). 
As a consequence of their views, entity theorists are more likely than incremental 
theorists to believe that they can draw conclusions about individuals – and groups – from 
a small sample of behavior (Levy & Dweck, 1999). So, for example, after observing a 
few members of a given group engaging in aggressive behavior, entity theorists are likely 
to conclude that (a) other group members are also prone to aggressive behavior and (b) 
the group members’ aggressive behavior will generalize across contexts (Levy & Dweck, 
1999). Thus, I predicted that entity theorists would be more strongly affected by 
information about personal and group performance than incremental theorists.  
The second individual difference variable of interest is self-esteem. Based on 
previous research, I expected children with low self-esteem to be more willing to accept 
negative feedback than positive feedback and children with high self-esteem to be more 
willing to accept positive feedback than negative feedback (Bandura, 1990; Cassidy et 
al., 2003; Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). Furthermore, recent research 
suggests that one’s preference for self-verifying feedback extends to the collective group 
level (Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004).  
The third individual difference of interest was conformity. Previous research 
indicates that children differ in the degree to which it is important to them to be similar to 
other group members (Berndt, 1979) and that inclination to conform changes with age 
(Berndt, 1979; Walker & Andrade, 1996). That is, when presented with a conflict 




children may differ in the extent to which they conform to group norms. Based on 
previous studies of conformity to group norms, I expected children high in conformity to 
be more affected by group feedback than children low in conformity (Abrams, 1985).  
Developmental Differences 
It is possible that age-related changes in children’s cognitive skills may mediate 
or moderate the relations between self and group views and thus, that young children’s 
thinking about social groups differs in several ways from that of older children. I 
identified two cognitive factors that may affect children’s integration of information 
about self and groups: centration and hierarchical classification. Centration, or young 
children’s tendency to focus on perceptually salient features in categorizing others, and 
their lack of cognitive flexibility may lead them to view group membership in an “all-or-
none” fashion. So, for example, preschool children may categorize others by gender, but 
not consider any particular girl to a better or worse exemplar than any other girl. Martin 
(1989) reported that preschool-age children tend to expect other children to behave in a 
gender-typical manner, even if they have not done so in the past. Older children, who 
have acquired more sophisticated logical skills, overcome these constraints (see Ruble & 
Martin, 2004), and thus I expected that children low in centration would be more affected 
by group feedback than children high in centration, who would be more likely to focus 
only on perceptually observable indicators of group membership. 
The second skill of interest was hierarchical classification (Parker & Day, 1971; 
Piaget, 1965). Young children often have difficulty understanding that something can 
belong to two categories at one time, or that one category may be subsumed by another. 




important for counterstereotypic thinking (Bigler & Liben, 1992; Trautner, Sahm, & 
Stevermann, 1983). Children who lack simple classification ability may struggle to 
comprehend that an individual is simultaneously an individual and a member of a group, 
and thus can belong to two (or more) categories at the same time. If children begin with 
stereotyped assumptions about categories, the correct processing of counterstereotypic 
stimuli will require simultaneous processing into two categories. In the realm of gender 
roles, this is evidenced by young children’s tendency to assume that all group members 
will conform to gender stereotypes, even if they have shown countersterotypic 
preferences in the past (Martin, 1989; Taylor, 1996). Children with more advanced 
classification skills have been found to be less rigid in their stereotypic beliefs than 
children with less advanced classification skills (Leahy & Shirk, 1984; Trautner et al., 






Participants were 120 elementary-school-age children (69 boys, 51 girls) recruited 
from a summer school program in the Midwest. Children ranged in age from 7 years, 1 
month, to 12 years, 1 month (M = 113 months, SD = 15.9 months). The majority of 
children (n = 104) were European American; 3 were African American, 6 were Asian 
American, 1 was Latino, and 6 were multiracial. 
Overview of Procedure 
At the beginning of the summer school session, children completed pretest 
measures of individual and developmental difference variables. The individual difference 
measures included assessments of entity/incremental theory of personality, trait self-
esteem, and conformity. The cognitive developmental measures included assessments of 
centration and hierarchical classification. See Figure 2 for overview of method. 
Next, children were randomly assigned a blue or red t-shirt to wear daily. That is, 
one half of the children in each classroom were assigned red shirts and one half were 
assigned blue shirts. Children wore the shirts for the duration of the summer school 
program. During this five-week period, teachers made frequent use of the color groups to 
label children (e.g., “Good morning, Blues and Reds”), and to organize the classrooms 
(as in Bigler, 1995; Bigler et al., 1997). These conditions have been found to increase 
attention to, and perceived importance of, social groups (Bem, 1981; Bigler, 1995). 





Approximately one week after the assignment of group membership, children 
participated in a series of three episodes in which information about the performance of 
self and color groups was manipulated. Task manipulation trials were separated in time 
by several days. In each situation, children completed a novel task and received feedback 
indicating that their personal performance was either excellent or mediocre and their 
ingroup’s performance was either excellent or mediocre. Thus, there were four 
conditions: personal performance excellent, group performance excellent (positive 
verifying); personal performance excellent, group performance mediocre (overachieving); 
personal performance mediocre, group performance excellent (underachieving); and 
personal performance mediocre, group performance mediocre (negative verifying).  
 In each manipulation episode, children first received information about either 
their own or their group’s performance on the task. The order of presentation (self versus 
group first) was counterbalanced. In the self first presentation, children first completed a 
cognitive task and received feedback about their personal performance. Children then 
completed a measure of their attitudes toward the task, including task performance 
evaluations, liking, performance malleability, and partner choice. Children were then 
given feedback about their group’s performance. Immediately after the presentation of 
this feedback, children completed the attitudes toward task and state self-esteem scales. 
 In the group first presentation, children were first given feedback about their 
group’s performance. Children then completed the attitudes toward task scale. Children 
next completed the task and received feedback about their personal performance. 
Immediately after the presentation of this feedback, children completed the attitudes 




 After spending several weeks in the classroom situation and completing all three 
task manipulation trials, children’s perceptions of the color groups were assessed. 
Children completed measures of (a) group satisfaction, (b) perceived similarity to group 
members, (c) group evaluations, and (d) peer preferences. Once testing was complete, the 
experimenters and classroom teachers conducted a debriefing session in which the 
experimental manipulation (i.e., false feedback about self and groups) and the purpose of 
the study were explained.  
Pretest Measures 
Theory of personality. Children’s belief in incremental versus entity theories of 
personality was assessed with a series of questions concerning individuals’ ability to 
change, based on recommendations by Erdley and Dweck (1993). Questions addressed 
children’s perceptions of ability to change both one’s personality (e.g., “A person’s 
personality is something they can’t change very much”) and one’s intelligence (e.g., “A 
person’s level of smartness is something they can’t change very much.”). Response 
options ranged from “really true” (4) to “really not true” (1). Children’s responses to the 
items were averaged; possible scores ranged from 1 to 4. All pretest measures appear in 
Appendix A. 
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was measured with academic and global subscales of the 
Perceived Competence Scale for Children (Harter, 1982). The scale includes a series of 
statements such as “Some kids are good at school.”  Children were asked to state if the 
characteristic is true of them. Response options ranged from “really true for me” (4) to 
“really not true for me” (1). Children’s responses to the items were averaged; possible 




were also asked to report how confident they were in their response. Response options 
were “really sure” (2), “a little sure” (1), and “not so sure” (0).  
Conformity. Children’s tendency to conform to the peer group was assessed with 
a self-attention scale (Abrams, 1985). This scale is designed to measure the extent to 
which children look to peers to provide behavioral standards. The scale includes a series 
of statements such as “I like to be the same as my friends.”  Children were asked to state 
if the characteristic was true of them. Response options ranged from “really true for me” 
(4) to “really not true for me” (1). Children’s responses to the items were averaged; 
possible scores ranged from 1 to 4. 
Centration. Children completed a measure of whether they are bound by 
perceptually salient characteristics in making decisions about people (Lobliner & Bigler, 
1993). Children were read brief stories containing three characters. Two of the characters 
shared a perceptually salient characteristic (e.g., age); one of those characters shared a 
non-perceptually-salient characteristic (e.g., liking the same activity) with another 
character. Children were asked to report which two characters were most similar to each 
other. The number of correct answers was summed; possible scores ranged from 0 to 6. 
Hierarchical classification. Children completed tasks of simple and multiple class 
inclusion (Trautner et al., 1983). The simple classification task assessed children’s 
understanding of items’ membership in a larger category (e.g., bears and elephants as 
types of animals). The multiple classification task assessed children’s understanding of 
items’ membership in a two subcategories as well as larger category (e.g., bears and 




number of correct answers was summed; possible scores on each task ranged from 0 to 2. 
A full version of the classification measure appears in Appendix A. 
Experimental Conditions 
Positive Verifying 
 Children in this condition (n = 30) received feedback indicating that their 
performance on the experimental tasks was “excellent” and that their ingroup performed 
“much better” than the outgroup on the task.  
Overachieving for Group 
 Children in this condition (n = 32) received feedback indicating that their 
performance on the experimental tasks was “excellent” and that their outgroup performed 
“much better” than the ingroup on the task. 
Underachieving for Group 
 Children in this condition (n = 29) received feedback indicating that their 
performance on the experimental tasks was “okay” and that their ingroup performed 
“much better” than the outgroup on the task. 
Negative Verifying  
 Children in this condition (n = 24) received feedback indicating that their 
performance on the experimental tasks was “okay” and that the outgroup performed 
“much better” than their ingroup on the task. 
Task Manipulations  
Overview 
Children completed three cognitive tasks in their classrooms: a spatial rotation 




each task, children received feedback about the performance of the self and the group. 
Task type and presentation order were counterbalanced. 
In each manipulation trial, children completed a cognitive task and received 
feedback about personal and group performance on the task. Children participated in one 
of two order presentations, depending on whether they first received information about 
the self or about the group. Feedback was presented in a variety of ways. Personal 
feedback was presented in the form of either a written comment on children’s answer 
sheets (trials 1 and 2) or a verbal statement of the names of children with “excellent” 
scores on the task and the presentation to each child of a small certificate (trial 3). Group 
feedback was presented in the form of either a written (trial 1) or a verbal statement that 
one group performed better on the task (trials 2 and 3). In addition to these statements, 
children were presented with a (fictitious) bar graph indicating the superior performance 
of one group relative to the other group.  
 Self first. In the self first presentation, children first completed a cognitive task. 
The experimenter then collected the children’s response sheets. Within five minutes, the 
experimenter returned children’s response sheets to them with a score reported on the 
sheet, (either 90 or 70) as well as a written comment that the score was “excellent” or 
“ok.” Children then completed the attitudes toward task scale.  
 Children were then given feedback about their group’s performance in the form of 
a written or verbal statement. For example, children received a sheet of “Fun Facts about 
this Puzzle” that included the statement “The red [blue] group did better at this puzzle 
than the blue [red] group” as well as a bar graph of scores of the red and blue groups. 




 Group first. In the group first presentation, children were first given feedback 
about their group’s performance in the form of a written or verbal statement. For 
example, children received a sheet of “Fun Facts about this Puzzle” that included the 
statement “The red [blue] group did better at this puzzle than the blue [red] group.” 
Children then completed the attitudes toward task scale. 
 Children then completed a cognitive task. The experimenter collected the 
children’s response sheets. Within five minutes, the experimenter returned children’s 
response sheets to them with their own score reported on the sheet, as well as a written 
comment that the score was “excellent” or “ok.” Children then completed the attitudes 
toward task and state self-esteem scales.  
Task Evaluation Measures 
Task performance evaluations (Q1-Q3, see Appendix C). Children rated their 
personal and ingroup’s task performance. Evaluations of personal performance were 
assessed with the question “How good do you think you are [will be] at the puzzle?”  
Evaluations of group performance were assessed with the questions (a) “How good do 
you think blue kids are [will be] at the puzzle?” and (b) “How good do you think red kids 
are [will be] at the puzzle?”  Response options for all items ranged from “really good” (4) 
to “not good” (1).  
 Task liking (Q4-Q5). Children rated their liking of the task (e.g., “How much did 
[will] you like the puzzle?”, “[After you have done it once,] How much [do you think 
you] would you like to do the puzzle again?”). Response options ranged from “a lot” (4) 




Task importance (Q6). Children were asked “How important is it to you to be 
good at this type of puzzle?” Response options range from “really important” (4) to “not 
important” (1).  
Task performance malleability (Q7). Children were asked “Do you think you 
could get better at the puzzle if you practiced?” Response options were “yes, a lot better” 
(3), “yes, a little bit better” (2), and “no” (1).  
Task partner choice (Q8). Children were asked “If you were going to do the puzzle with 
a partner, who would you want to work with?” with response options of “a blue group 
member,” “a red group member,” or “either.”   
State self-esteem 
State self-esteem. Children completed a measure of state self-esteem based on 
Heatherton & Polivy’s (1991) State Self-Esteem Scale. This scale assesses how children 
feel about themselves at the current moment (e.g., “I feel sure that I understand things.”). 
Response options are “not at all” (1), “a little bit” (2), and “pretty much” (3). Children’s 
responses to the items were averaged; possible scores ranged from 1 to 3. 
Intergroup Attitudes Outcome Measures 
After the completion of the three task manipulation trials, children completed a 
posttest session including several measures of ingroup identification and intergroup 
attitudes. All intergroup outcome measures are included in Appendix D. 
Group importance. Participants were asked, “How important is being a blue/red 
group member to you?” with response options ranging from “not important” (0) to “very 




Group happiness. Participants were asked, “How happy are you to be in the blue 
[red] group?” with response options ranging from “not happy” (0) to “very happy” (3).  
Group preference. Participants were asked, “If you could choose the color of your 
shirt, would you choose a blue shirt or a red shirt?” and “If a new student came to your 
class, would that student choose a blue shirt or a red shirt?”  
Self-Group similarity. Participants were also asked to rate how similar they 
believed themselves to be to each of the color groups on a scale from “not at all” (1) to “a 
lot” (4).  
Peer preferences. Participants rated how much they liked to play with each other 
child in their class, using the response options “a lot” (3), “a little” (2), or “not too much” 
(1). Scores were averaged to obtain composite ratings for ingroup peers and outgroup 
peers.  
Trait ratings. Children completed two measures of the characteristics of the red 
and blue groups. In the first, participants rated how many members of each color group 
possess seven positive traits (friendly, helpful, nice, pretty/handsome, smart, good, hard 
working), as in previous research by Bigler and colleagues (Bigler, 1995; Bigler et al., 
1997; Bigler et al., 2001; Brown & Bigler, 2002). Response options were “all of the red 
[blue] group” (3), “most of the red [blue] group” (2), “some of the red [blue] group” (1), 
or “none of the red [blue] group” (0). Scores were averaged and thus total possible scores 
ranged from 0 to 3.  
The second measure of ingroup and outgroup characteristics asked children to 
complete a list of statements regarding members of the color groups (e.g., “Some kids do 




“mostly red kids, some blue kids,” “both red and blue kids,” “mostly blue kids, some red 
kids,” and “only blue kids.” This scale is adapted from the Perceived Competence Scale 
for Children (Harter, 1982) and has been used in several previous intergroup studies 
(Brown & Bigler, 2002; Bigler et al., 2004). 
A secondary purpose in administering the Harter-based intergroup measure was to 
examine the extent to which children projected their self-views onto their ingroups. 
Because the questions on this intergroup bias measure were based on the self-esteem 
measure which children completed at pretest, analyses could be conducted to examine 
whether children projected their self-views on particular items onto their groups (e.g., 
whether a child who described herself as good at reading would also believe her ingroup 
to be good at reading). Previous research (Bigler et al., 2004) using this paradigm has 
indicated that children will project their views of themselves onto novel ingroups.  
Competency ratings. Participants were asked to predict the performance of the 
two color groups on a series of tasks. Items included the three cognitive tasks performed 
in the manipulations (e.g., a rotation puzzle) as well as six generalization items (e.g., a 
spelling bee). Children could choose the ingroup, the outgroup, or a tie. The number of 
times the ingroup was rated as more competent than the outgroup were summed; total 







 Data analysis was a five-step process. In the first step, I examined children’s 
scores on the individual and developmental difference measures and assessed whether 
these scores varied across condition. In the second step, I examined whether (a) 
children’s evaluations of the experimental tasks varied based on the feedback they 
received about their personal performance and (b) developmental and individual 
differences affected the relation between personal feedback and task evaluations. In the 
third step, I examined whether (a) children’s evaluations of the experimental tasks varied 
based on the feedback they received about their group’s performance and (b) 
developmental and individual differences affected the relation between group feedback 
and task evaluations. In the fourth step, I examined whether (a) children’s evaluations of 
the experimental tasks varied based on the consistency or inconsistency of the feedback 
they received about their personal and group performance and (b) developmental and 
individual differences affected the relation between feedback consistency and task 
evaluations. In the fifth step, I examined whether (a) children’s ratings of ingroup 
identification and bias varied across conditions and (b) developmental and individual 
differences affected children’s ratings of ingroup identification and bias.  
Individual and Developmental Difference Measures 
Theory of personality. Children completed a series of questions asking whether 
they thought people’s personalities or levels of intelligence could change. Cronbach’s 
alphas for the personality and intelligence subscales were .68 and .71, respectively. The 




.61, p < .01). Children demonstrated a high level of endorsement of the statements (M = 
3.12, SD = 0.65), indicating that they believed people’s personalities and levels of 
intelligence are stable (i.e., they endorsed an entity theory of personality/intelligence). 
Theory of personality/intelligence was not significantly correlated with age. A one-way 
ANOVA by condition indicated no significant effects of condition on theory of 
personality/intelligence, indicating that children did not differ prior to their assignment 
into the conditions. 
Self-esteem. Children completed the academic and global subscales of the Harter 
Perceived Competence Scale for children (Harter, 1982). Children endorsed relatively 
high levels of academic (M = 3.13, SD = 0.57) and global (M = 3.39, SD = 0.52) self-
esteem. Cronbach’s alphas for the academic and global subscales were .77 and .73, 
respectively. Academic and global self-esteem were significantly correlated (r = .61, p < 
.01). Neither domain of self-esteem was significantly correlated with age. See Table 1 for 
correlations between pretest measures and Table 2 for pretest measure means and 
standard deviations.  
After completing each item of the Harter scale, children were also asked to report 
how confident they were in their response. Children were relatively certain of their self-
views (academic: M = 1.57, SD = 0.42; global; M = 1.64, SD = 0.34). Certainty was 
positively correlated with self-esteem in both the academic (r =.26, p < .01) and global (r 
=.33, p < .01) domains, indicating that children with higher self-esteem were more certain 
of their views of themselves than children with lower self-esteem. One-way ANOVAs by 




self-esteem or self-view certainty, indicating that children in the four conditions did not 
differ prior to their assignment into the conditions. 
Conformity. Abrams (1985) separated his measure into two subscales, self-
awareness and behavioral conformity. In this sample, Cronbach’s alphas for the self-
awareness and behavioral conformity subscales were alpha = .67 & .56, respectively. 
Only the behavioral conformity subscores were used in subsequent analyses. Conformity 
was not significantly correlated with age. A one-way ANOVA by condition indicated no 
significant effects of condition on conformity, indicating that children did not differ prior 
to their assignment into the conditions. 
Centration. Children completed measures of centration based on age, gender, and 
shirt color. Children overall performed well on the tasks (M = 5.39, SD = 1.10), showing 
little evidence of perceptual centration. Performance on the centration measure was 
significantly correlated with age (r = .26, p < .05), with older children showing less 
centration than younger children. A one-way ANOVA by condition indicated no 
significant effects of condition on centration, indicating that children did not differ prior 
to their assignment into the conditions. 
Classification skill. Children completed measures of their simple and multiple 
classification ability. Their numbers of correct responses to each type of question were 
summed. Children overall performed better on the simple (M = 1.65, SD = 0.60) than the 
multiple (M = 1.18, SD = 0.78) classification tasks. Performance on simple and multiple 
classification tasks were significantly correlated (r = .46, p < .01) and performance on 
both tasks was significantly correlated with age (simple: r = .26, p < .05; multiple: r = 




children. A one-way ANOVA by condition indicated no significant effects of condition 
on classification skill, indicating that children did not differ prior to their assignment into 
the conditions. 
Task Evaluations: Effects of Personal Feedback 
One purpose of the study was to examine whether information about their 
personal performance would influence children’s (a) predictions for group performance 
(i.e., whether they would project from the self onto the group) and (b) perceptions of the 
performance domain (e.g., whether performing well on a task would lead children to like 
the task more). To test these questions, I asked the subset of children who received 
personal feedback before group feedback to complete a task evaluation measure after the 
personal feedback presentation. Responses were analyzed with a one-way ANOVA by 
feedback type (positive vs. negative). Means and standard deviations for task evaluation 
measures appear in Table 4. 
Task performance evaluation: self rating. Children were first asked to report on 
their own performance on the cognitive tasks. When presented with information about 
their personal performance, results indicated a significant effect of feedback type, F (1, 
171) = 5.86, p < .05. Children who received positive feedback about their performance 
rated themselves as better at the task than children who received negative feedback about 
their performance (see Table 4 for means). 
Task performance evaluations: group ratings. To compute a single index of 
ingroup bias, children’s ratings of outgroup ability were subtracted from their ratings of 
ingroup ability. Thus, more positive scores indicate greater ingroup bias. (Separate 




scores were significantly different from chance (0), indicating that children predicted the 
ingroup would do better on the task than the outgroup, M = 0.75, t = 8.34, p < .001. A 
one-way ANOVA by feedback type (positive vs. negative) indicated that children did not 
differ in their level of ingroup bias based on whether they received positive or negative 
feedback regarding their own performance.  
Task engagement. A task engagement composite score was created by averaging 
children’s scores on task liking, desire to perform the task again, and task importance. 
(Separate analyses for individual items are presented in Appendix E.)  Effects of 
feedback on task engagement were examined with a one-way ANOVA by feedback type. 
Results indicated a marginally significant effect of personal feedback type on task 
engagement, with children who received positive personal feedback rating themselves as 
more engaged with the task, F(1,171) = 3.19, p = .076. 
Task performance malleability. Effects of condition on perceptions of potential to 
improve on the tasks with practice were examined with a one-way ANOVA by feedback 
type. Results indicated a marginally significant effect of personal feedback type, F (1, 
171) = 3.12, p = .079. Children who received positive feedback were more likely to say 
they could improve their performance with practice than children who received negative 
feedback about their performance.  
Task partner choice. Effects of feedback type on partner preferences were 
examined with chi-square analyses. Specifically, I examined whether the percentage of 
children who chose an ingroup member as a partner varied across conditions. Results 
indicated no significant effects of personal feedback type on partner choice. Children 




whereas children who received negative personal feedback chose an ingroup partner 28% 
of the time.  
Effects of Developmental and Individual Difference Variables 
 For each of the major dependent variables in the study (including task-specific as 
well as intergroup attitudes), a regression model was run including age, cognitive 
complexity (person perception, simple classification, and multiple classification), self-
esteem, theory of personality, and conformity. Separate regression models were run for 
children who received positive and negative feedback. Theoretically-relevant findings are 
described below. A complete presentation of developmental and individual difference 
analyses appears in Appendix F. 
Task performance evaluations: self. Children with higher self-esteem evaluated 
their performance more positively than children with lower self-esteem, regardless of 
whether they received positive or negative feedback, βs = .42 & .39, ts = 3.06 & 2.06, ps 
< .05. 
Task performance evaluations: group. Results indicated no significant effects of 
developmental or individual differences.  
Task engagement. Younger children reported greater engagement with the task 
than older children when they received positive personal feedback, β = -.45, t = -3.69, p = 
.001, but not when they received negative personal feedback.  
Task performance malleability. Children with higher self-esteem rated themselves 
as more able to improve with practice than children with lower self-esteem when they 
received negative personal feedback, β = .39, t = 2.65, p < .05, but not when they 




Task Evaluations: Effects of Group Feedback 
A second purpose of the study was to examine whether information about their 
group’s performance would influence children’s (a) predictions for their own 
performance (i.e., whether they would project from the group onto the self) and (b) 
perceptions of the performance domain (e.g., whether belonging to a group that 
performed well on a task would lead children to like the task more). To test these 
questions, I asked the subset of children who received group feedback before personal 
feedback to complete a task evaluation measure after the group feedback presentation. 
Responses were analyzed with a one-way ANOVA by feedback type (positive vs. 
negative). Means and standard deviations for task evaluation measures appear in Table 4. 
Task performance evaluation: self rating. Children were first asked to report on 
their own performance on the cognitive tasks. A one-way ANOVA by feedback type 
(positive vs. negative) indicated no significant effect of group feedback type on 
children’s predictions of their own abilities (see Table 4 for means). 
Task performance evaluation: group ratings. To compute a single index of 
ingroup bias, children’s ratings of outgroup ability were subtracted from their ratings of 
ingroup ability. Thus, more positive scores indicate greater ingroup bias. (Separate 
analyses for ingroup and outgroup ratings are presented in Appendix E.)  Children’s 
scores were significantly different from chance (0), indicating that children predicted the 
ingroup would do better on the task than the outgroup, M = 0.71, t(111) = 5.62, p < .001. 
A one-way ANOVA by feedback type (positive vs. negative) indicated a marginally 




showing more ingroup bias than children who received negative group feedback, 
F(1,109) = 2.96, p = .088.  
Task engagement. A task engagement composite score was created by averaging 
children’s scores on task liking, desire to perform the task again, and task importance. 
(Separate analyses for individual items are presented in Appendix E.)  Effects of 
condition on task engagement were examined with a one-way ANOVA by feedback type. 
Results indicated no significant effects of group feedback type on task engagement. 
Task performance malleability. Effects of condition on perceptions of potential to 
improve on the tasks with practice were examined with a one-way ANOVA by feedback 
type. Results indicated no significant effects of group feedback type on task performance 
malleability. 
Task partner choice. Effects of feedback type on partner preferences were 
examined with chi-square analyses. Specifically, I examined whether the percentage of 
children who chose an ingroup member as a partner varied across conditions. Results 
indicated no significant effects of group feedback type on partner choice. Children who 
received positive ingroup feedback chose an ingroup partner 38% of the time, whereas 
children who received negative ingroup feedback chose an ingroup partner 40% of the 
time.  
Effects of Developmental and Individual Difference Variables 
 For each of the major dependent variables, a regression model was run including 
age, cognitive complexity (person perception, simple classification, and multiple 
classification), self-esteem, theory of personality, and conformity. Separate regression 




relevant findings are described below. A complete presentation of developmental and 
individual difference analyses appears in Appendix F. 
Task performance evaluations: self. Results indicated no significant effects of 
developmental or individual differences.  
Task performance evaluations: group. Results indicated no significant effects of 
developmental or individual differences.  
Task engagement. Children with lower cognitive complexity reported greater 
engagement with the task than children with greater cognitive complexity when they 
received positive group feedback, β = -.42, t = -2.56, p < .05, but not when they received 
negative group feedback.  
Task performance malleability. Results indicated no significant effects of 
developmental or individual differences.  
Task Evaluations: Effects of Self/Group Consistency 
The primary purpose of the study was to examine the effects of consistency or 
inconsistency between personal and group feedback on children’s views of themselves, 
their groups, and the task domains. In order to examine the effects of self-group 
consistency on children’s views of the tasks, all children completed a task evaluation 
measure at the end of each task manipulation trial (after they had received both the 
personal and group feedback). Responses were examined with 2 (personal feedback: 
positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) ANOVAs. 
Means and standard deviations for all task evaluation measures appear in Table 5. 




Task performance evaluations: self. Children were first asked to report on their 
own performance on the cognitive tasks. Effects of condition on perceptions of ability 
were examined with a 2 (personal feedback: positive versus negative) by 2 (group 
feedback: positive versus negative) ANOVA. Results indicated a significant effect of 
personal feedback on children’s perceptions of their own abilities, F (1, 280) = 18.84, p < 
.001, with children who received positive personal feedback stating they were better at 
the task than children who received negative personal feedback (see Table 5 for means).  
Task performance evaluations: group. To compute a single index of ingroup bias, 
children’s ratings of outgroup ability were subtracted from their ratings of ingroup 
ability. Thus, more positive scores indicate greater ingroup bias. (Separate analyses for 
ingroup and outgroup ratings are presented in Appendix E.) Children’s scores were 
significantly different from chance (0), indicating that children predicted the ingroup 
would do better on the task than the outgroup, M = 0.66, t(280) = 7.69, p < .001. Effects 
of condition on children’s ingroup bias were examined with a 2 (personal feedback: 
positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) ANOVA. 
Results indicated a significant effect of personal feedback on ingroup bias, with children 
who received positive personal feedback showing greater bias than children who received 
negative personal feedback, F(1, 277) = 12.96, p < .05. Results also indicated a 
significant effect of group feedback, with children who received positive group feedback 
indicating greater ingroup bias than children who received negative group feedback, F(1, 
277) = 11.89, p < .05. See Table 5 for means. 
Task engagement. A task engagement composite score was created by averaging 




(Separate analyses for individual items are presented in Appendix E.)  Effects of 
condition on engagement with the tasks were examined with a 2 (personal feedback: 
positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) ANOVA. 
Results indicated a significant effect of personal feedback, with children who received 
positive personal feedback indicating greater engagement with the tasks than children 
who received negative personal feedback, F(1, 280) = 7.60, p < .01.  
Task performance malleability. Effects of condition on perceptions of potential to 
improve on the tasks with practice were examined with a 2 (personal feedback: positive 
versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) ANOVA. Results 
indicated a marginally significant effect of personal feedback, with children who received 
positive personal feedback claiming greater ability to improve their performance with 
practice than children who received negative personal feedback, F(1,279) = 3.18, p = 
.076. 
Task partner choice. Effects of condition on partner preferences were examined 
with chi-square analyses. Results indicated no effects of personal or group feedback on 
partner choice.  
State self-esteem. Effects of condition on the state self-esteem scale were 
examined with a 2 (personal feedback: positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: 
positive versus negative) ANOVA. Results indicated a marginally significant effect of 
group feedback on children’s state self-esteem, with children who received negative 
group feedback showing slightly higher levels of state self-esteem than children who 




Effects of Developmental and Individual Difference Variables 
 For each of the major dependent variables, a regression model was run including 
age, cognitive complexity (person perception, simple classification, and multiple 
classification), self-esteem, theory of personality, and conformity. Separate regression 
models were run for each condition. Theoretically-relevant findings are described below. 
A complete presentation of developmental and individual difference analyses appears in 
Appendix F. 
Task performance evaluations: self. Self-esteem was positively related to 
children’s ratings of their own performance for children in the overachieving and 
underachieving conditions, βs = .29 & .483, ts = 2.04 & 3.48, ps < .05. Self-esteem was 
negatively related to children’s ratings of their own performance for children in the 
negative verifying condition, β = -.55, t = -2.11, p < .05.  
Conformity was positively related to children’s ratings of their own performance 
for children in the positive verifying condition, β = .64, t = 3.26, p < .01, but negatively 
related for children in the overachieving condition, β = -.44, t = -2.47, p < .05.  
Task performance evaluations: group. Results indicated no significant effects of 
developmental or individual differences.  
Task engagement. Conformity was positively related to children’s task 
engagement for children in the positive verifying and underachieving conditions, βs = .43 
& .29, ts = 2.33 & 1.98, ps < .055. 
Task performance malleability. Self-esteem was positively related to children’s 
ratings of their ability to improve with practice for children in the overachieving and 




State self-esteem. Self-esteem was positively related to children’s ratings of state 
self-esteem for children in the positive verifying and underachieving conditions, βs = .64 
& .57, ts = 3.49 & 4.32, ps < .01. Conformity was negatively related to children’s ratings 
of state self-esteem for children in the positive verifying and underachieving conditions, 
βs = -.75 & -.42, ts = -3.69 & -3.01, ps < .01.  
Intergroup Attitudes 
The primary purpose of the study was to examine the effects of consistency or 
inconsistency between personal and group feedback on children’s views of themselves, 
their groups, and the task domains. In order to examine the effects of self-group 
consistency on children’s intergroup attitudes, all children completed a series of measures 
of intergroup attitudes after completing all three task manipulation trials. Effects of 
condition on children’s ingroup identification and bias were examined with 2 (personal 
feedback: positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) 
ANOVAs. Only children who participated in two or more of the task manipulations were 
included in the analyses of intergroup attitudes. Eight children who completed posttest 
measures but did not complete the required number of task manipulations were thus 
excluded. Means and standard deviations for all intergroup attitudes measures appear in 
Table 7. Correlations among intergroup attitudes measures appear in Table 6.  
Group importance. Effects of condition on ratings of the importance of group 
membership were examined with a 2 (personal feedback: positive versus negative) by 2 
(group feedback: positive versus negative) ANOVA. Results indicated a marginally 




feedback reporting their group membership was more important to them, F(1, 86) = 3.40, 
p = .069 (see Table 7 for means).  
Group happiness. Effects of condition on ratings of happiness with group 
membership were examined with a 2 (personal feedback: positive versus negative) by 2 
(group feedback: positive versus negative) ANOVA. Results indicated no significant 
effects of personal or group feedback on children’s happiness with their group 
membership. 
Group preference. Effects of condition on desire to maintain one’s group 
membership were examined with chi-square analyses. Results indicated no effects of 
personal or group feedback on children’s desire to maintain their group membership. 
Children in the negative verifying condition were most likely to want to maintain their 
group membership (83%), followed by children in the positive verifying (75%) and the 
underachieving (70%) conditions; children in the overachieving condition were least 
likely to want to maintain their group membership (67%). 
Effects of condition on predictions for a new child’s preferred group membership 
were examined with chi-square analyses. Results indicated no effects of personal or 
group feedback on children’s predictions for a new child’s preferred group membership. 
The majority of children (58%) stated that a new student joining their class would have 
no preference as to group membership. Children in the overachieving condition were 
most likely to state that a new student would prefer their own ingroup (42%); children in 
the positive verifying condition were least likely to state that a new student would prefer 




Self-Group similarity. To compute a single index of perceived similarity, 
children’s ratings of outgroup similarity were subtracted from their ratings of ingroup 
similarity. Thus, positive scores indicate greater perceived similarity to the ingroup; 
negative scores indicate greater perceived similarity to the outgroup. To examine whether 
children showed an overall similarity bias in favor of the ingroup, a t-test was conducted 
comparing perceived similarity ratings to chance (0). Results indicated children 
considered themselves more similar to the ingroup than to the outgroup (M = 0.63) at a 
level significantly above chance, t(88) = 3.75, p < .001. 
Effects of condition on perceived similarity were examined with a 2 (personal 
feedback: positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) 
ANOVA. Results indicated no significant effects of personal or group feedback on 
children’s perceived similarity to the ingroup. 
Peer preferences. To compute a single index of ingroup bias, children’s ratings of 
outgroup peers were subtracted from their ratings of ingroup peers. Thus, more positive 
scores indicate greater ingroup bias. To examine whether children showed an overall bias 
in favor of ingroup peers, a t-test was conducted comparing levels of bias on peer 
preference ratings to chance (0). Results indicated that children preferred ingroup 
members at a level marginally above chance, M = 0.07, t(87) = 1.64, p = .10. 
Effects of condition on peer preference ratings were examined with a 2 (personal 
feedback: positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) 
ANOVA. Results indicated no effects of condition on children’s peer biases. 
Trait ratings—Bigler scale. To compute a single index of ingroup bias, children’s 




positive scores indicate greater ingroup bias. To examine whether children showed an 
overall bias in favor of the ingroup, a t-test was conducted comparing levels of bias on 
trait ratings to chance (0). Results indicated that responding on the Bigler trait ratings 
measure was significantly different from chance, M = 0.46, t(90) = 6.01, p < .001. Means 
were significantly different from chance in all conditions.  
Effects of condition on trait ratings were examined with a 2 (personal feedback: 
positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) ANOVA. 
Results indicated no significant effects of personal or group feedback on children’s trait 
ratings. 
Trait ratings—Harter-based intergroup scale. Overall, children were mostly 
likely to give neutral responses (76%). When children expressed a group bias, they 
typically favored the ingroup (21%). Responses favoring the outgroup were rare (3%). To 
compute a single index of ingroup bias, children’s ratings of outgroup traits were 
subtracted from their ratings of ingroup traits. Thus, more positive scores indicate greater 
ingroup bias. To examine whether children showed an overall bias in favor of the 
ingroup, a t-test was conducted comparing levels of bias on trait ratings to chance (0). 
Results indicated that responding on the Harter-based intergroup trait ratings measure 
was significantly different from chance, M = 2.55, t(89) = 5.30, p < .001. Means were 
significantly or marginally significantly different from chance in all conditions (all ps < 
.09).  
Effects of condition on trait ratings were examined with a 2 (personal feedback: 
positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) ANOVA. 




.087, with children who received more positive group feedback showing higher levels of 
bias. The main effect of group feedback was subsumed by a marginally significant 
personal by group feedback interaction, F(3,86) = 2.87, p = .094. Post-hoc Tukey tests 
indicated a marginally significant difference between the overachieving (M = 4.5) and 
positive verifying (M = 1.25) conditions, p = .085. 
A secondary purpose in administering the Harter self-esteem scale and the Harter-
based intergroup measure was to examine the extent to which children projected their 
self-views onto their ingroups. For these analyses, children’s responses on each item of 
the self-esteem measure were first recoded as positive or negative. Because elementary-
school-age children typically have highly positive self-concepts, responses indicating that 
a positive statement was “really true for me” were coded as positive and all other 
responses (“sort of true”, “sort of not true”, and “really not true”) were coded as negative. 
This led to approximately equal proportions of positive and negative responses. Chi-
square analyses were then conducted evaluating children’s responses on the Harter-based 
intergroup bias measure (ingroup biased, outgroup biased, or neutral) relative to their 
evaluations of their own performance (positive or negative). A chi-square analysis of all 
children’s responses was nonsignificant, χ2 (2) = 1.57, p > .10, indicating that, in general, 
children did not project their self-views onto their groups. (A full presentation of 
children’s personal and group responses appears in Table 8.) 
Chi-square analyses compared the four conditions in their likelihood of ingroup, 
outgroup, and neutral responding. Separate analyses were conducted for domains in 
which children evaluated themselves positively versus negatively. For items on which 




condition, χ2 (6) = 31.67, p < .001. For items on which children evaluated themselves 
negatively, results indicated a significant effect of condition, χ2 (6) = 52.00, p < .001. 
Children in the positive verifying and underachieving conditions were more likely to 
show ingroup bias in domains where they rated their own ability positively. Children in 
the negative verifying and overachieving conditions were more likely to show ingroup 
bias in domains where they rated their own ability negatively.  
Competency ratings. Children’s judgments of who would win hypothetical 
contests were separated into task-relevant (i.e., those related to the task manipulations, 
such as a memory contest) and non-task-relevant (i.e., those not related to the task 
manipulations, such as an art contest). When rating task-relevant competencies, 
children’s ingroup responses did not differ significantly from chance (1), M = 1.08, t(89) 
= 0.65, p = .51 . Effects of condition on competency ratings were examined with a 2 
(personal feedback: positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus 
negative) ANOVA. Results indicated no effects of condition on children’s competency 
ratings. 
When rating non-task-relevant competencies, children’s ingroup responses were 
significantly above chance (2), M = 2.63, t(91) = 2.94, p < .01 . Effects of condition on 
competency ratings were examined with a 2 (personal feedback: positive versus negative) 
by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) ANOVA. Results indicated a marginally 
significant effect of personal feedback on children’s non-task-relevant competencies, 
with children who received negative personal feedback showing higher ingroup bias than 




Effects of Developmental and Individual Difference Variables 
For each of the major dependent variables (including task-specific as well as 
intergroup attitudes), a regression model was run including age, cognitive complexity 
(person perception, simple classification, and multiple classification), self-esteem, theory 
of personality, and conformity. Due to the small sample sizes, conditions were combined 
for analyses of ingroup identification and intergroup attitudes. Results indicated no 
significant effects of developmental or individual differences on children’s responses on 
measures of ingroup identification or intergroup attitudes. A complete presentation of 





The primary purpose of the study was to examine the effects of children’s self-
views on their views of social groups (i.e., ingroup and outgroup), and the reciprocal 
effects of children’s views of social groups on their self-perceptions. Previous theoretical 
and empirical work has suggested effects that operate in both directions (i.e., self to 
group and vice versa). I was especially interested in examining outcomes among children 
whose self and group views conflicted. To examine the effects of self- and group-view 
consistency, I used an experimental design in which children were assigned to novel 
social groups and asked to complete novel cognitive tasks. The feedback that children 
received about their own performance, and the performance of their ingroup and 
outgroup, was manipulated. Specifically, children were assigned to one of four 
conditions: (a) positive self-verifying (i.e., positive feedback about personal and group 
performance), (b) overachieving (i.e., positive feedback about personal performance and 
negative feedback about group performance), (c) underachieving (i.e., negative feedback 
about personal performance and positive feedback about group performance), and (d) 
negative self-verifying (i.e., negative feedback about personal and group performance). 
I first examined the consequences of feedback about the self on children’s 
predictions for group performance. In the absence of information about group 
performance, children who received positive feedback about their personal performance 
predicted that their ingroup would be better at the task than children who received 
negative feedback about their performance. That is, children appeared to project their 
self-views onto their groups. This finding is consistent with previous research (Bigler et 




Robbins & Kreuger, 2005) indicating that adults and children will use information about 
the self to make inferences about group characteristics. 
I also examined the consequences of feedback about the self on children’s 
perceptions of the performance domain (e.g., whether performing well on a task would 
lead children to like the task more). Children who received positive feedback about their 
own performance were slightly higher in task engagement than children who received 
negative feedback. 
I next examined consequences of feedback about the group on children’s 
predictions for personal performance and perceptions of the performance domain. 
Children did not appear to project from the group onto the self; children who received 
positive feedback about their group’s performance did not differ from children who 
received negative feedback when asked to predict their personal performance. This is 
consistent with previous research (Robbins & Krueger, 2005) indicating that people are 
more willing to generalize from the self to the group than from the group to the self. 
Feedback about the group did not appear to affect children’s task engagement. 
I next examined the primary question of interest: the effect of consistency 
between self and group views on children’s views of themselves, their groups, and the 
task domains. In order to examine the effects of self-group consistency on children’s 
views of the tasks, all children completed a task evaluation measure at the end of each 
task manipulation trial (after they had received both the personal and group feedback).  
Findings indicated few effects of consistency versus inconsistency. Instead, there 
were several significant main effects of feedback about the self. Children who received 




indicated greater ability to improve their performance with practice, and showed greater 
ingroup bias on task performance evaluations than children who received negative 
personal feedback. There was also a significant main effect of group feedback on 
children’s ingroup bias on task performance evaluations; children who received positive 
group feedback showed more ingroup bias than children who received negative group 
feedback. 
Despite the lack of predicted interaction effects, inspection of the means indicated 
several consistent patterns of mean difference. Across several measures, children in the 
positive verifying condition showed the most positive views of the tasks, whereas 
children in the negative verifying condition showed the most negative views of the tasks. 
All of these findings are relevant to issues of academic disidentification. Children who 
are relatively high performing members of typically successful groups (such a high 
achieving white students) are especially likely to endorse positive views of academic 
tasks and enjoy high academic motivation. Children who are relatively low performing 
members of typically unsuccessful groups (such a low achieving African American 
students) are especially likely to develop negative attitudes toward academic tasks and 
low academic motivation (e.g., Major et al., 1998). 
Unexpectedly, children who received negative feedback about their group’s 
performance showed slightly higher state self-esteem. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that children who have received negative feedback might attempt to 
compensate for this threat to self-esteem by overestimating their abilities in other areas. 
After children had completed the three task manipulation trials, they participated 




intergroup bias. There were no significant effects of condition on most measures of 
children’s identification with their ingroups (e.g., group happiness, self/group similarity). 
Children who received negative personal feedback did consider their group membership 
marginally more important. Similar to the finding regarding state self-esteem, it is 
possible that these children may be searching for alternative sources of self-esteem. 
 Children’s satisfaction with their group membership was not affected by 
typicality. That is, atypical children did not appear to have either a stronger ingroup 
identification, as predicted by optimal distinctiveness theory, or decreased satisfaction 
with group membership, as predicted by self-verification theory. Previous studies 
examining the effects of atypicality on children’s ingroup identification (Bigler et al., 
2004; Patterson & Bigler, in press) have found evidence for decreased satisfaction with 
group membership and increased perceived similarity to ingroup members among 
atypical children, consistent with the predictions of self-verification and optimal 
distinctiveness theories. One meaningful difference between the current study and these 
previous studies is that in the current study information regarding typicality was 
presented only during the manipulation trials, whereas in the previous studies information 
regarding typicality was consistently available, including while children were completing 
the posttest measures. Perhaps if the children had completed measures of group 
identification and satisfaction after each trial (at the time when they completed the task 
evaluation measure), effects of condition on group satisfaction and ingroup identification 
would have been evident. 
In general, children showed ingroup-biased responding on the majority of the 




context made group membership and intergroup comparisons salient. Although there 
were no significant differences across conditions, there was again evidence of a 
consistent pattern of responding across groups. Those children who received negative 
verifying information showed the lowest levels of ingroup bias. 
The intergroup measure based on the Harter self-esteem scale allowed for the 
examination of ingroup bias and projection onto the ingroup. Overall, children did not 
appear to project their self-views onto their ingroups, as in a previous study (Bigler et al., 
2004). In the previous study, however, children completed the intergroup measure shortly 
after assignment to the novel groups and before receiving any information about the 
groups. In the current study, children completed the intergroup measure at the end of the 
group manipulation, after receiving information about their group’s performance on three 
different occasions. Children may be more likely to assume that their groups are like 
themselves in situations where little information about the group is available. Consistent 
with this explanation, extant research has found that individuals are more likely to project 
their self-views onto a novel or minimal group than onto an existing social group 
(Robbins & Krueger, 2005). There are, however, extant studies indicating projection onto 
social groups (e.g., Rudman, Greenwald, & McGhee’s (2001) study of self-views and 
gender stereotypes). 
Though children did not appear to project their self-views onto their ingroups 
overall, analyses revealed some intriguing effects of condition on relations between self 
and group views.  Specifically, children in the positive verifying and underachieving 
conditions (those who had received positive feedback about their group’s abilities on the 




which they had rated their own ability positively. Children in the negative verifying and 
overachieving conditions those who had received negative feedback about their group’s 
abilities on the novel tasks) were more likely than other children to show ingroup bias in 
domains in which they had rated their own ability negatively. These findings indicate that 
children may have internalized and generalized the messages contained in the task 
manipulation trials and concluded that their group was successful in domain which were 
either self-relevant or non-self-relevant. 
In addition, children demonstrated ingroup bias on the Harter-based intergroup 
measure. Children in the overachieving condition showed the highest levels of ingroup 
bias on this measure. These children, who have received feedback indicating that they 
performed well in a domain in which their group performed poorly, may be especially 
motivated to view their group positively in other domains in order to make their group 
views consistent with their positive self-views and the positive feedback they have 
received about their performance on the novel tasks. The group differences on this 
measure may be due to the fact that this measure specifically assessed bias in the 
academic domain, which may have been more closely related to children’s experiences 
with the novel task than more general measures of bias.  
The relatively small number of participants within each condition prevented 
statistical analyses of the role of individual and developmental differences in mediating 
or moderating the effects of self and group consistency on child outcomes. Nonetheless, I 
was able to examine the effects of age, cognitive complexity, theory of personality, and 
conformity on the tendency for children’s self views to affect their views of the group 




In examining children’s responses to positive and negative personal feedback, 
regression analyses indicated that children with high self-esteem believed themselves to 
be able to improve their performance with practice, regardless of whether they received 
positive or negative personal feedback. This indicates that positive self-esteem may be a 
protective factor, insulating children from some of the detrimental effects of negative 
feedback.  
In examining children’s responses to consistency between personal and group 
feedback, regression analyses indicated meaningful influences of self-esteem and 
conformity. Children in the positive verifying and overachieving conditions who were 
high in conformity were also more engaged with the task, indicating that receiving 
positive group feedback may lead to greater identification with a domain for children 
who place high value on being similar to their peers.  
Conformity was, however, negatively related to state self-esteem for children in 
the positive verifying and overachieving conditions (those who received positive group 
feedback). This may indicate that children high in conformity may feel increased anxiety 
or pressure to live up to group standards, whereas children low in conformity may be less 
affected by group-based expectations. This explanation is consistent with Mahalingam 
and Ruble’s (2005) work on Asian American students and academic anxiety.  
Self-esteem was related to beliefs about ability to improve with practice for 
children in the overachieving and underachieving conditions, indicating that children may 
rely on their preexisting self-concepts when information about self and group conflict. 
This finding is consistent with the predictions of self-verification theory. Given that 




intergroup attitudes measures, it is possible that some effects were obscured. For 
example, children’s preexisting level of self-esteem might have influenced ingroup 
identification when children were asked to reconcile conflicting feedback about self and 
group, but not when personal and group feedback were consistent.  
Theory of personality was not a significant predictor of children’s task 
evaluations, ingroup identification, or intergroup attitudes. One possible explanation for 
these findings is that the theory of personality measure specifically assessed others’ 
ability to change. It may be that children’s perceptions of their own ability to change are 
distinct from their perceptions of others’ ability to do so. This possibility is consistent 
with the lack of relations between theory of personality and performance malleability 
ratings on the task evaluation measure. 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the reciprocal relations between 
children’s self and group views. Though relatively little experimental work with children 
has examined these questions, several theoretical perspectives from social psychological 
research with adults made relevant predictions. First, self-categorization theory (Hogg 
1996; Turner et al., 1987) posits that individuals will strive to view themselves in a way 
that is consistent with the expectations for their social group. For example, self-
categorization theory would predict that women and girls would view themselves as less 
skilled at mathematics than men and boys due to self-stereotyping in the mathematics 
domain. In the context of the present study, self-categorization theory would predict that 
children who received feedback indicating that their group did not perform well in the 




decreased interest in the task domain relative to children who received feedback 
indicating that their group performed well. 
An alternative theory, self-verification theory (Swann & Read, 1981; Swann et 
al., 2004) posits that individuals wish to have others view them as they view themselves. 
A large body of research by Swann and colleagues (e.g., Swann et al., 1992; Swann et al., 
2000; Swann et al., 2004) has found that individuals prefer feedback, relationships, and 
groups that confirm their self-views, even when these views are negative. In the context 
of the present study, self-verification theory predicts that individuals whose groups did 
not confirm their self-views (i.e., those who received inconsistent personal and group 
feedback) would be less happy with their group membership and less likely to wish to 
maintain their group membership than children whose self-views were confirmed (i.e., 
those who received consistent feedback).  
A third relevant theory, optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991) has as its 
main tenet the assertion that individuals wish to feel both similar to others and personally 
unique. Brewer argues that group membership, particularly membership in groups that 
are to some degree exclusive, helps to fulfill these needs. Research from the optimal 
distinctiveness perspective (e.g., Pickett et al., 2002) has found that when individuals are 
led to believe they are atypical of their ingroup, they will strive to view themselves as 
typical of or similar to the group in other ways. In addition, threats to optimal 
distinctiveness, such as atypicality, have also been found to lead to increased perceptions 
of difference between the ingroup and the outgroup (Pickett & Brewer, 2001). In the 
context of the present study, ODT predicts that children who received inconsistent 




increase their ingroup identification and bias as a way to maintain feelings of optimal 
distinctiveness. 
Overall, results of the current study indicated little support for self-categorization 
theory. Children did not appear to base their predictions for their own ability or liking of 
the task on the feedback they had received regarding their group’s performance. Children 
were more likely to base their predictions for their group’s performance on their own 
performance. Children showed ingroup bias in their predictions for ingroup and outgroup 
performance in the task domain regardless of the type of feedback they received, but this 
bias was stronger when children received positive group feedback. On most other 
measures of ingroup bias, children in all conditions showed equivalent levels of ingroup-
biased responding. This finding is consistent with extant research indicating that children 
tend to favor their ingroups, even when those groups are negatively stereotyped (Aboud, 
1988).  
Results also indicated relatively little support for self-verification theory. The 
most common results were main effects of personal or group feedback, rather  
than interaction effects indicating effects of consistency versus inconsistency. Children 
whose self and group feedback were consistent were not happier with their group 
membership than children who received inconsistent feedback, nor did they have more 
positive views of the tasks. One finding that was consistent with self-verification theory, 
however, was the effect of self-esteem on children’s assessments of their ability to 
improve with practice in the non-verifying (overachieving and underachieving) 




concepts when information about self and group conflict, as self-verification theory 
would predict. 
 This study differs significantly form previous self-verification studies in that the 
procedure was designed to manipulate individuals’ views of personal and group ability, 
rather than simply measuring individuals’ perceptions of their abilities or characteristics 
and providing information that was verifying or non-verifying. This methodology 
allowed for greater experimental control of the messages participants received regarding 
their abilities and characteristics. One possible limitation, however, is that perceptions of 
ability resulting from a small amount of recently acquired information may not be as 
strongly held as other self-views and thus may have had weaker effects on children’s 
ingroup bias and perceptions of the novel tasks. However, previous studies indicated that 
feedback regarding the abilities and characteristics of novel groups (Bigler et al. 1997; 
Bigler et al. 2004) and typicality as a novel group member (Bigler et al., 2004; Patterson 
& Bigler, in press) can affect children’s views of themselves and their social groups. 
Optimal distinctiveness theory predicts that children who received inconsistent 
personal and group feedback would feel uncomfortably distinct from others and thus 
increase ingroup identification and strive to view themselves as typical of or similar to 
the group in other ways. Results of this study did not support this prediction. Children 
who received inconsistent feedback were neither more nor less identified with their 
ingroups than children who received consistent feedback. Children who received 
inconsistent feedback were, for the most part, neither higher nor lower in ingroup bias 







The results of this study indicate that feedback about personal and group abilities 
can affect children’s views of the relevant domains, and that children’s reactions to 
differing forms of feedback may be influenced by individual differences, particularly in 
self-esteem and conformity. The current study was limited, however, in being conducted 
with children attending summer school, who may differ from other children in systematic 
and meaningful ways. Future research should further explore the effects of feedback and 
individual differences on children’s ingroup identification, intergroup bias, and 
identification with and achievement in relevant domains with larger and broader samples.  
 
   
Figure 1. 
Developmental Intergroup Theory (Bigler & Liben, 2006) 
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→ Posttest measures 
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Table 1. 
Pretest Measures Correlation Matrix 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1  Age (months) -.164 -.114 .073 .110 -.095 -.126 -.080 .265* .372** .256* 
2  Academic Self Esteem  .608** .258** .326** .165† .175† .270** .016 .146 -.146 
3  Global Self Esteem   .125 .438** .297** .300** .354** -.032 .087 -.107 
4  Academic Self Esteem Certainty    .627** .048 .166† .258** .043 -.130 .003 
5  Global Self Esteem Certainty     .126 .319** .438** .044 .037 -.057 
6  Theory of Personality      .615** .459** .115 .003 -.076 
7  Theory of Intelligence       .442** -.010 -.127 .043 
8  Conformity        .065 .174 -.171 
9  Simple Classification         .464** .059 
10  Multiple Classification          .069 
11  Person Perception 
 
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 
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Table 2. 
Pretest Measures    
 M SD  Possible Range Observed Range 
Age (months) 113.3 15.80 N/A 85 to 145 
Academic Self Esteem 3.13 0.57 1 to 4 1.57 to 4.00 
Global Self Esteem 3.39 0.52 1 to 4 1.71 to 4.00 
Academic Self Esteem Certainty 1.57 0.42 0 to 2 0.43 to 2.00 
Global Self Esteem Certainty 1.64 0.34 0 to 2 0.57 to 2.00 
Theory of Personality 3.18 0.65 1 to 4 1.25 to 4.00 
Theory of Intelligence 3.06 0.79 1 to 4 1.00 to 4.00 
Conformity 2.88 0.80 1 to 4 1.00 to 4.00 
Simple Classification 1.65 0.60 0 to 2 0 to 2 
Multiple Classification 1.18 0.78 0 to 2 0 to 2 
Person Perception 5.39 1.10 0 to 6 0 to 6 
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Table 3. 
Task Evaluations Correlation Matrix 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Age (months) -.165** -.018 -.165** -.307** -.313** -.262** -.224** .193* 
2 Task performance: self  .172** .520** .604** .506** .447** .483** .163* 
3 Task performance: ingroup   .015 .206** .188** .280** .207** .142* 
4 Task performance: outgroup    .431** .340** .335** .288** -.078 
5 Task liking      .803** .552** .630** -.040 
6 Desire to try again       .513** .596** .048 
7 Task performance malleability       .474** .070 
8 Task importance          -.066  
9 State self-esteem  
 
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Table 4. 
Task Evaluations  
Measure Personal Feedback Condition Group Feedback Condition 
 Positive Negative Positive Negative 
 M   (SD)   M   (SD)   M   (SD)   M   (SD) 
Task performance: self 3.19 (1.02) 2.81 (0.99) 3.09 (0.96) 3.13 (0.92) 
Task performance: ingroup bias 0.82 (1.15) 0.67 (1.22) 0.93 (1.04) 0.49 (1.59)  
Task engagement 2.85 (1.01) 2.57 (1.06) 2.95 (0.89) 2.75 (1.05) 
Task performance malleability 2.49 (0.70) 2.28 (0.83) 2.60 (0.68) 2.48 (0.74) 
 
Note. Higher scores indicate more positive views. For the ingroup bias measure, positive scores indicate ingroup bias, negative 
scores indicate outgroup bias. 
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Table 5. 
Task Evaluations: Effects of Self/Group Consistency 
Measure Condition 
 Positive Verifying Negative Verifying Overachieving Underachieving 
 M   (SD)   M   (SD)   M   (SD)   M   (SD) 
Task performance: self 3.35 (0.90) 2.75 (1.03) 3.18 (0.98) 2.75 (1.14) 
Task performance: ingroup bias 1.06 (1.21) 0.22 (1.59) 0.67 (1.58) 0.66 (1.23) 
Task engagement 2.92 (0.93) 2.41 (1.08) 2.79 (1.15) 2.60 (1.04) 
Task performance malleability 2.48 (0.70) 2.27 (0.79) 2.50 (0.66) 2.42 (0.75) 
State self-esteem 2.26 (0.34) 2.40 (0.45) 2.33 (0.38) 2.25 (0.37) 
 
Note. Higher scores indicate more positive views. For the ingroup bias measure, positive scores indicate ingroup bias, negative 
scores indicate outgroup bias. 
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Table 6. 
Intergroup Attitudes Correlation Matrix 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Age (months) -.249* -.173 .057 -.135 -.063 -.146 -.053 -0.44 
2 Trait bias—Bigler scale  .439** .254* .035 .059 .253* .297** .217* 
3 Trait bias—Harter-based scale  .055 .110 .207† .369** .559** .503** 
4 Peer bias    .154 .215* .212* .012 -.014 
5 Group happiness     .517** .165 .164 .459 
6 Group Importance      .118 .062 .107 
7 Self/Group similarity       .297** .301** 
8 Task competence         .583** 
9 Non-Task competence 
 
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < . 07 
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Table 7. 
Intergroup Attitudes  
Measure       Condition 
 Positive Verifying Negative Verifying Overachieving Underachieving 
  M   (SD)  M   (SD)   M   (SD)   M   (SD) 
Ingroup trait 2.19 (0.43) 1.94 (0.59) 2.09 (0.63) 2.22 (0.66) 
Outgroup trait 1.74 (0.72) 1.71 (0.53) 1.66 (0.48) 1.60 (0.72) 
Trait bias 0.45 (0.91) 0.23 (0.42) 0.43 (0.70) 0.62 (0.69) 
Harter-based scale ingroup 1.33 (3.34) 2.89 (4.11) 4.71 (5.63) 2.70 (4.18) 
Harter-based scale outgroup 0.08 (0.28) 0.89 (1.13) 0.21 (0.66) 0.52 (0.90) 
Harter-based scale bias 1.25 (3.38) 2.00 (4.30) 4.50 (5.76) 2.17 (4.12) 
Ingroup peers 2.11 (0.34) 1.90 (0.43) 1.85 (0.39) 1.86 (0.46) 
Outgroup peers 2.01 (0.46)  1.93 (0.52) 1.77 (0.48) 1.85 (0.45) 
Peer bias 0.14 (0.35) -0.03 (0.42) 0.09 (0.35) 0.02 (0.40)   
Group happiness 2.25 (0.68) 2.17 (0.86) 1.92 (1.21) 2.43 (0.94) 
Group importance 1.54 (1.14) 2.00 (1.08) 1.71 (1.27) 2.09 (1.04) 
Self/Group similarity 0.48 (1.81) 0.56 (1.38) 0.91 (1.44) 0.48 (1.67) 
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Task Competence 1.29 (1.04) 0.89 (1.13) 0.87 (1.26) 1.17 (1.11) 
Non-Task Competence 2.08 (1.98) 3.00 (1.83) 2.52 (2.16) 2.91 (2.19) 
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Table 8. 
Harter Scale Self and Group Ratings 
Measure Condition 
  Positive Verifying Negative Verifying Overachieving Underachieving Total 
Self Positive 
 Ingroup 19 (11%) 17 (16%) 43 (27%) 49 (31%) 128 (22%) 
 Outgroup  1 (>1%) 6 (6%) 4 (2%) 2 (1%) 13 (2%) 
 Neutral 148 (88%) 82 (78%) 114 (71%) 108 (68%) 452 (76%)  
Self Negative 
 Ingroup 10 (7%) 28 (27%) 64 (35%) 24 (16%) 127 (22%) 
 Outgroup  1 (>1%) 6 (6%) 4 (2%) 9 (6%) 20 (3%)  
 Neutral 133 (92%) 70 (67%) 117 (63%) 117 (78%) 437 (75%) 
 
Note. Percentages represent the percent of responses in a given column which fall into a particular row (e.g., in the positive 
verifying condition, 11% of responses to questions in which children rated themselves positively were ingroup biased, >1% 
were outgroup biased, and 88% were neutral).  
   
APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Pretest Measures 
Trait Self Esteem (Perceived Competence Scale for Children) 
Some kids… Is that true for you? 
      YES             NO 
      Really   Sort of          Sort of          Really  
      True  True          Not True          Not True 
 
1. Are good at schoolwork   1  2  3  4  
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
2. Do things fine    1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
3. Do well in school    1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
4. Are happy with the way they are  1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
5. Are just as smart as others   1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
6. Feel good about the way they act  1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
7. Can figure out answers   1  2  3  4  
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
8. Finish schoolwork quickly   1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
9. Are good kids    1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
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10. Remember things easily   1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
11. Are sure that they act right  1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
12. Understand what they read  1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
13. Want to stay the same (not change) 1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
14. Are sure of themselves   1  2  3  4 
 How sure are you? really sure  a little sure   not so sure 
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THEORY OF PERSONALITY 
 
Do you think these statements are true or not true? 
1. A person can change the way they act, but they can’t change how smart they really are. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
2. Someone's personality is something about them that they can't change very much. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
3. A person can do things to get people to like them, but they can't change their real personality. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
4. How smart someone is is something about them that they can't change very much. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
5. Everyone has a certain level of smartness, and it is something that they can’t do too much 
about. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
6. Everyone has a certain personality, and it is something that they can’t do too much about. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
7. A person can change the way they act, but they can’t change their real personality. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
8. A person can do things to do well in school, but they can't change how smart they really are. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 71 
 
   
CONFORMITY 
 
Do you think these statements are true or not true? 
 
1. I always say what I think.  
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
2. I notice my inner feelings a lot. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
3. It is always best to mix with the crowd. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
4. I am always sure about what I think. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
5. I can always tell when my mood is changing. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
6. I like to be the same as my friends. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
7. It is better to agree with people than to argue about what you think. 
YES      NO 
4-Really true  3-Sort of true  2-Sort of not true 1-Really not true 
 
8. I compare myself with other people a lot. 
YES      NO 




   
HIERARCHICAL CLASSIFICATION 
 
Simple Class Inclusion 
 
The experimenter will show the child a picture of 2 grey bears and 4 grey elephants. The 
experimenter will ask the child (1) “Are there more bears or more animals?” and (2) “Are there 
more elephants or more grey things?” 
 
Multiple Class Inclusion 
 
The experimenter will show the child a picture of 3 grey bears, 3 brown bears, and 2 grey 
elephants. The experimenter will ask the child (1) “Are there more grey bears or more grey 








Appendix B: Sample Task Stimuli  
Spatial Rotation Task 
You will see a shape and then four shapes like it. Circle the shape that is like the original shape 
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Pattern Copying Task 
   
Memory Task 
Remember the things you saw earlier. Use your memory to answer these questions. 
 
1. Which of these did you see? 
A. a green lizard 
B. a red ribbon 
C. a blue paper clip 
D. a yellow bracelet 
 
2. You saw a playing card. What card was it? 
A. the two of clubs 
B. the king of hearts 
C. the three of hearts 
D. the joker 
 







   
Appendix C: Task-Specific Measures 
ATTITUDES TOWARD TASK 
 
How good do you think you are [will be] at pattern [rotation, memory] puzzles? 
 
4-Really good  3-Pretty good  2-A little good  1-Not good 
 
 
How good do you think blue kids are at pattern [rotation, memory] puzzles? 
 
4-Really good  3-Pretty good  2-A little good  1-Not good 
 
 
How good do you think red kids are pattern [rotation, memory] puzzles? 
 
4-Really good  3-Pretty good  2-A little good  1-Not good 
 
 
How much did you like the pattern [rotation, memory] puzzle? 
 
4-A lot   3-Pretty much  2-A little bit  1-Not at all 
 
 
How much would you like to do the pattern [rotation, memory] puzzle again? 
 
4-A lot   3-Pretty much  2-A little bit  1-Not at all 
 
 
How important is it to you to be good at pattern [rotation, memory] puzzles? 
 
4-A lot   3-Pretty much  2-A little bit  1-Not at all 
 
 
Do you think you could get better at the pattern [rotation, memory] puzzle if you practiced? 
 
3-Yes, a lot better 2-Yes, a little bit better 3-No 
 
 
If you were going to do the pattern [rotation, memory] puzzle with a partner, who would you 
want to work with? 
1-a red group member  2-a blue group member 3-either 
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STATE SELF-ESTEEM 
1 – Not at all  2 – A little bit  3 – Pretty much 
 
1. I feel sure about my abilities.    1  2  3  
 
2. I am worried about whether people think I am   1  2  3  
doing a good job or a bad job. 
 
3. I feel frustrated or rattled about the job I am doing. 1  2  3  
 
4. I feel that I am having trouble understanding   1  2  3  
things that I read. 
 
5. I feel that others respect and admire me.   1  2  3  
 
6. I feel self-conscious.     1  2  3  
 
7. I feel as smart as others.     1  2  3  
 
8. I feel displeased with myself.    1  2  3  
 
9. I feel good about myself.      1  2  3  
 
10. I am worried about what other people think of me. 1  2  3  
 
11. I feel sure that I understand things.   1  2  3  
 
12. I feel like I am not as good as others at this moment. 1  2  3  
 
13. I feel concerned about how other people see me.  1  2  3  
 
14. I feel that I am less good at school than other kids  1  2  3  
right now. 
 
15. I feel like I am not doing well.    1  2  3  
 






   
 Appendix D: Intergroup Outcome Measures 
ATTITUDES 
Think about the kids in RED group in this school. How many of the children in the RED group 
are: 
   ALL  MOST  SOME  NONE 
 
Friendly  3  2  1  0    
Helpful  3  2  1  0 
Nice   3  2  1  0 
Pretty or Handsome  3  2  1  0 
Smart   3  2  1  0 
Good   3  2  1  0 
Hard Working  3  2  1  0 
 
Now, think about the kids in the BLUE group in this school. How many of the children in the 
BLUE group are: 
 
ALL  MOST  SOME  NONE 
 
Friendly  3  2  1  0    
Helpful  3  2  1  0 
Nice   3  2  1  0 
Pretty or Handsome  3  2  1  0 
Smart   3  2  1  0 
Good   3  2  1  0 
Hard Working  3  2  1  0    
 
1. If you could change the color of your shirt, would you change it or would you keep the color 
shirt you have now? 
 
   Keep It   Change It 
 
2. If a new student came to your class, would that student pick a red shirt or a blue shirt? 
 
   Red  Blue  Either   
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COMPETENCY RATINGS 
 
1. If the red group kids competed against the blue group kids in a big school spelling contest, 
who do you think would win––the red group or the blue group (or would it be a tie)? 
 
   Red  Blue  Tie 
 
2. If the red group kids competed against the blue group kids in a big school pattern puzzle 
contest, who do you think would win––the red group or the blue group (or would it be a tie)? 
 
   Red  Blue  Tie 
 
3. If the red group kids competed against the blue group kids in a big school math contest, who 
do you think would win––the red group or the blue group (or would it be a tie)? 
 
   Red  Blue  Tie 
 
4. If the red group kids competed against the blue group kids in a big school memory contest, 
who do you think would win––the red group or the blue group (or would it be a tie)? 
 
   Red  Blue  Tie 
 
5. If the red group kids competed against the blue group kids in a big school art contest, who do 
you think would win––the red group or the blue group (or would it be a tie)? 
 
   Red  Blue  Tie 
 
6. If the red group kids competed against the blue group kids in a big school rotation puzzle 
contest, who do you think would win––the red group or the blue group (or would it be a tie)? 
 
   Red  Blue  Tie 
 
7. If we compared all the red group kids to all the blue group kids in the school, who would have 
most time-outs for bad behavior at the end of the year––the red group or the blue group (or 
would it be a tie)? 
   Red  Blue  Tie 
 
8. If we compared all the red group kids to all the blue group kids in the school, who would have 
forgotten their homework more at the end of the year––the red group or the blue group (or 
would it be a tie)? 
   Red  Blue  Tie 
 
9. If we compared all the red group kids to all the blue group kids in the school, which color 
group will have the most important and high paying jobs when they grow up? 
 
   Red  Blue  Tie 
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You are in the _____ group. How important is being a _____ group member to you? 
 
Very important  Pretty important A little important Not important 
 
How happy are you to be the ______ group? 
 
Very happy  Pretty happy  A little happy  Not happy 
 
How much are you like the kids in the red group? 
 
0-not at all alike     1-a little alike     2-somewhat alike     3-pretty much alike     4-a lot alike 
 
 
How much are you like the kids in the blue group? 
 





   
 
Some kids… Is that true of … kids? 
          ONLY      MOSTLY       Some Red/ MOSTLY ONLY  
           Red Red  Some Blue  Blue   Blue 
 
Are good at schoolwork  1               2                       3                       4               5  
Are sure of themselves  1               2                       3                       4               5 
Do well in school   1               2                       3                       4               5 
Are happy with the way they are 1               2                       3                       4               5 
Are just as smart as others  1               2                       3                       4               5 
Feel good about the way they act 1               2                       3                       4               5 
Can figure out answers  1               2                       3                       4               5 
Finish schoolwork quickly  1               2                       3                       4               5 
Are good kids    1               2                       3                       4               5 
Remember things easily  1               2                       3                       4               5 
Are sure that they act right  1               2                       3                       4               5 
Understand what they read  1               2                       3                       4               5 
Want to stay the same (not change) 1               2                       3                       4               5 
Do things fine    1               2                       3                       4               5 
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PEER PREFERENCE 
 
How much do you like to play with __________?  A lot, a little, or not too much? 
 
Name     A LOT  A LITTLE NOT TOO MUCH 
_________________        3          2                            1  
_________________        3          2                            1  
_________________        3          2                            1  
_________________        3          2                            1  
_________________        3          2                            1  
_________________        3          2                            1  
_________________        3          2                            1  
_________________        3          2                            1  
_________________        3          2                            1  
_________________        3          2                            1  
_________________        3          2                            1  
_________________        3          2                            1  




   
Appendix E: Additional Analyses 
Task Evaluations: Effects of Personal Feedback 
Group ratings. Children were then asked to report on their predictions of the abilities of 
the ingroup and the outgroup. When presented with information about their personal 
performance, for ratings of the ingroup, results indicated a significant effect of feedback type, 
F(1, 171) = 4.58, p < .05. Children who received positive feedback about their performance 
predicted that their ingroup would be better at the task than children who received negative 
feedback about their performance. Results indicated no effects of personal feedback type on 
children’s predictions for the outgroup’s performance. 
Task liking. Children were asked to rate how much they liked the task and how much 
they would like to perform the task again. Effects of condition on children’s liking of the tasks 
were examined with a one-way ANOVA by feedback type. Results indicated no effects of 
feedback type on liking of the task when children were presented with personal performance 
feedback.  
Desire to perform task again. When children were asked how much they would like to 
complete the task again, results indicated no effects of personal feedback type on desire to 
perform the task again.  
Task importance. Effects of condition on perceived task importance were examined with 
a one-way ANOVA by feedback type. Results indicated a significant effect of personal feedback 
type, F(1, 171) = 6.36, p < .05. Children who received positive feedback about their own 
performance rated the tasks as more important to them than children who received negative 
feedback about their performance.  
Task Evaluations: Effects of Group Feedback 
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Group ratings. Children were then asked to report on their predictions of the abilities of 
the ingroup and the outgroup. Results indicated no effects of group feedback type on children’s 
predictions for the ingroup or outgroup’s performance. Children predicted that the ingroup would 
perform better than the outgroup regardless of whether they received positive or negative 
feedback about their group’s performance.  
Task liking. Children were asked to rate how much they liked the task and how much 
they would like to perform the task again. Effects of condition on children’s liking of the tasks 
were examined with a one-way ANOVA by feedback type. Results indicated no effects of group 
feedback type on liking of the task. 
Desire to perform task again. When children were asked how much they would like to 
complete the task again, results indicated a marginally significant effect of feedback type on 
desire to perform the task again, F(1, 113) = 2.91, p = .091, with children who received positive 
group feedback indicating a greater desire to perform the task again than children who received 
negative group feedback.  
Task importance. Effects of condition on perceived task importance were examined with 
a one-way ANOVA by feedback type. Results indicated no significant effects of group feedback 
type on task importance. 
Task Evaluations: Effects of Self/Group Consistency 
Task performance evaluations: group. Children were then asked to report on their 
perceptions of the abilities of the ingroup and the outgroup. When children were asked about the 
ingroup’s abilities, results indicated no significant effects of personal or group feedback on 
children’s perceptions of the ingroup’s abilities.  
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When children were asked about the outgroup’s abilities, results indicated significant 
effects of personal, F(1, 270) = 7.26, p < .01, and group feedback, F(1, 270) = 3.98, p < .05. 
Children who received positive feedback about their own or their group’s performance gave 
higher ratings of the outgroup’s ability than children who received negative feedback (see Table 
1 for means). Children in the overachieving and underachieving conditions did not differ 
significantly from children in the other two conditions.  
Task liking. Effects of condition on children’s liking of the tasks were examined with a 2 
(personal feedback: positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) 
ANOVA. Results indicated a significant effect of personal feedback on children’s liking of the 
tasks, with children who received positive personal feedback indicating greater liking of the task 
than children who received negative personal feedback, F(1, 279) = 7.21, p < .01. Results also 
indicated a marginally significant effect of group feedback on the task, with children who 
received positive group feedback indicating greater liking of the task than children who received 
negative group feedback, F(1, 281) = 3.35, p = .068. Children in the overachieving and 
underachieving conditions did not differ significantly from children in the other two conditions.  
Desire to perform task again. When children were asked how much they would like to 
complete the task again, results indicated a significant effect of personal feedback, with children 
who received positive personal feedback indicating a greater desire to perform the task again 
than children who received negative personal feedback, F(1, 279) = 4.90, p < .05. Results also 
indicated a marginally significant effect of group feedback, F(1, 279) = 2.78, p = .097, with 
children who received positive group feedback indicating a greater desire to perform the task 
again than children who received negative group feedback. Children in the overachieving and 
underachieving conditions did not differ significantly from children in the other two conditions.  
 86 
 
   
Task importance. Effects of condition on perceived task importance were examined with 
a 2 (personal feedback: positive versus negative) by 2 (group feedback: positive versus negative) 
ANOVA. Results indicated a significant effect of personal feedback on children’s perceptions of 
the importance of the task, F(1, 279) = 6.14, p < .05, with children who received positive 
personal feedback rating the task as more important to them than children who received negative 
personal feedback.  
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Appendix F  
Task Evaluations: Effects of Personal Feedback 
Task performance evaluation: self 
Feedback type 
Positive β t p 
Age (months) -.135 -.996 .324 
Cognitive complexity -.026 -.195 .846 
Self-esteem .416 3.066 .003 
Conformity -.268 -1.652 .105 
Theory of personality/intelligence .030 .187 .852 
Negative  
Age (months) -.113 -.757 .454 
Cognitive complexity -.193 -1.278 .208 
Self-esteem .389 2.604 .013 
Conformity .122 .809 .423 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.028 -.181 .857 
 
Task performance evaluation: ingroup bias 
Feedback type 
Positive β t p 
Age (months) .045 .318 .752 
Cognitive complexity .034 .240 .812 
Self-esteem -.290 -2.021 .049 
Conformity -.108 -.631 .531 
Theory of personality/intelligence .076 .445 .658 
Negative  
Age (months) .118 .768 .447 
Cognitive complexity -.304 -1.964 .057 
Self-esteem -.019 -.127 .899 
Conformity -.315 -2.052 .047 
Theory of personality/intelligence .238 1.500 .141 
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Task engagement 
Feedback type 
Positive β t p 
Age (months) -.448 -3.692 .001 
Cognitive complexity -.081 -.674 .503 
Self-esteem .180 1.484 .144 
Conformity .146 1.006 .319 
Theory of personality/intelligence .004 .031 .976 
Negative  
Age (months) -.277 -1.821 .076 
Cognitive complexity -.094 -.613 .543 
Self-esteem .280 1.838 .073 
Conformity .021 .137 .891 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.120 -.756 .454 
 
 
Task performance malleability 
Feedback type 
Positive β t p 
Age (months) -.313 -2.292 .026 
Cognitive complexity -.157 -1.164 .250 
Self-esteem .048 .349 .729 
Conformity .124 .756 .453 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.291 -1.781 .081 
Negative  
Age (months) -.135 -.921 .362 
Cognitive complexity .019 .127 .900 
Self-esteem .388 2.649 .011 
Conformity .066 .447 .657 




   
Task Evaluations: Effects of Group Feedback 
 
Task performance evaluation: self 
Feedback type 
Positive β t p 
Age (months) -.079 -.435 .666 
Cognitive complexity .057 .319 .752 
Self-esteem .284 1.455 .156 
Conformity .097 .531 .599 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.202 -1.095 .282 
Negative  
Age (months) -.198 -.903 .374 
Cognitive complexity .320 1.584 .124 
Self-esteem .319 1.775 .086 
Conformity -.215 -.979 .336 
Theory of personality/intelligence .131 .521 .606 
 
Task performance evaluation: ingroup bias 
Feedback type 
Positive β t p 
Age (months) .286 1.541 .134 
Cognitive complexity .103 .563 .578 
Self-esteem -.178 -.881 .385 
Conformity .025 .131 .897 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.268 -1.430 .163 
Negative  
Age (months) -.071 -.309 .760 
Cognitive complexity .003 .014 .989 
Self-esteem -.144 -.754 .457 
Conformity -.124 -.534 .597 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.274 -1.035 .309 
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Task engagement 
Feedback type 
Positive β t p 
Age (months) -.216 -1.304 .202 
Cognitive complexity -.419 -2.558 .016 
Self-esteem .322 1.808 .080 
Conformity -.073 -.438 .665 
Theory of personality/intelligence .195 1.156 .257 
Negative  
Age (months) -.189 -.841 .407 
Cognitive complexity .339 1.635 .113 
Self-esteem .010 .057 .955 
Conformity .141 .625 .537 
Theory of personality/intelligence .196 .761 .453 
  
 
Task performance malleability 
Feedback type 
Positive β t p 
Age (months) .012 .062 .951 
Cognitive complexity -.086 -.461 .648 
Self-esteem .372 1.799 .082 
Conformity -.045 -.233 .817 
Theory of personality/intelligence .107 .560 .580 
Negative  
Age (months) -.051 -.220 .827 
Cognitive complexity .047 .222 .826 
Self-esteem .342 1.825 .078 
Conformity .310 1.351 .187 




   
Task Evaluations: Effects of Self/Group Consistency 
 
Task performance evaluation: self 
 
Positive verifying  β t p 
Age (months) .021 .145 .886 
Cognitive complexity .175 1.076 .289 
Self-esteem -.350 -1.939 .060 
Conformity .641 3.260 .002 
Theory of personality/intelligence .075 .454 .653 
Negative verifying 
Age (months) -.511 -1.604 .121 
Cognitive complexity .764 2.424 .023 
Self-esteem -.555 -2.111 .045 
Conformity -.240 -1.211 .237 
Theory of personality/intelligence .743 2.632 .014 
Overachieving 
Age (months) -.134 -1.024 .311 
Cognitive complexity .143 1.137 .262 
Self-esteem .289 2.038 .047 
Conformity -.443 -2.470 .017 
Theory of personality/intelligence .365 1.934 .059 
Underachieving  
Age (months) .005 .034 .973 
Cognitive complexity -.045 -.291 .773 
Self-esteem .483 3.479 .001 
Conformity .143 .995 .325 




   
Task performance evaluation: ingroup bias 
 
Positive verifying  β t p 
Age (months) -.133 -.830 .412 
Cognitive complexity .007 .038 .970 
Self-esteem -.511 -2.550 .015 
Conformity .393 1.802 .080 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.261 -1.431 .161 
Negative verifying 
Age (months) .540 1.444 .161 
Cognitive complexity -.605 -1.634 .115 
Self-esteem -.280 -.907 .373 
Conformity .025 .106 .916 
Theory of personality/intelligence .362 1.091 .286 
Overachieving 
Age (months) -.007 -.041 .967 
Cognitive complexity .185 1.215 .231 
Self-esteem .138 .789 .434 
Conformity -.029 -.131 .896 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.218 -.930 .357 
Underachieving  
Age (months) -.048 -.301 .765 
Cognitive complexity -.036 -.201 .841 
Self-esteem .039 .243 .809 
Conformity -.314 -1.910 .063 




   
Task engagement 
 
Positive verifying  β t p 
Age (months) -.553 -4.106 .000 
Cognitive complexity -.108 -.709 .483 
Self-esteem -.191 -1.133 .265 
Conformity .426 2.326 .026 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.091 -.595 .556 
Negative verifying 
Age (months) -1.042 -3.483 .002 
Cognitive complexity 1.165 3.930 .001 
Self-esteem -.324 -1.310 .202 
Conformity -.315 -1.690 .103 
Theory of personality/intelligence .351 1.322 .198 
Overachieving 
Age (months) -.240 -1.933 .059 
Cognitive complexity -.079 -.658 .514 
Self-esteem .250 1.853 .070 
Conformity -.017 -.098 .922 
Theory of personality/intelligence .403 2.244 .030 
Underachieving  
Age (months) -.041 -.296 .768 
Cognitive complexity -.062 -.397 .693 
Self-esteem .281 2.004 .051 
Conformity .288 1.985 .053 





   
Task performance malleability 
 
Positive verifying  β t p 
Age (months) -.541 -3.595 .001 
Cognitive complexity -.007 -.042 .967 
Self-esteem -.220 -1.173 .248 
Conformity .174 .851 .400 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.122 -.710 .482 
Negative verifying 
Age (months) -1.111 -3.805 .001 
Cognitive complexity .848 2.931 .007 
Self-esteem .302 1.252 .222 
Conformity -.008 -.042 .967 
Theory of personality/intelligence .015 .059 .953 
Overachieving 
Age (months) -.309 -2.134 .038 
Cognitive complexity -.026 -.186 .853 
Self-esteem .311 1.983 .053 
Conformity .263 1.324 .192 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.184 -.880 .383 
Underachieving  
Age (months) -.013 -.091 .928 
Cognitive complexity -.195 -1.203 .236 
Self-esteem .440 3.025 .004 
Conformity -.035 -.233 .817 




   
State self-esteem 
 
Positive verifying  β t p 
Age (months) .230 1.572 .126 
Cognitive complexity .178 1.041 .305 
Self-esteem .636 3.491 .001 
Conformity -.749 -3.687 .001 
Theory of personality/intelligence .017 .102 .919 
Negative verifying 
Age (months) -.263 -.727 .476 
Cognitive complexity .178 .488 .631 
Self-esteem .362 .976 .341 
Conformity .090 .419 .680 
Theory of personality/intelligence .157 .433 .669 
Overachieving 
Age (months) .359 2.429 .020 
Cognitive complexity .003 .017 .986 
Self-esteem .220 1.325 .194 
Conformity -.297 -1.378 .177 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.016 -.073 .942 
Underachieving  
Age (months) .158 1.251 .219 
Cognitive complexity .041 .280 .781 
Self-esteem .566 4.329 .000 
Conformity -.419 -3.010 .005 





   
Intergroup Attitudes 
 
Trait Bias—Bigler scale  β t p 
Age (months) -.083 -.550 .585 
Cognitive complexity -.254 -1.672 .101 
Self-esteem .012 .083 .934 
Conformity -.192 -1.238 .222 
Theory of personality/intelligence .142 .903 .371 
 
Trait Bias—Harter-based scale 
Age (months) -.135 -.860 .394 
Cognitive complexity -.032 -.203 .840 
Self-esteem .078 .504 .616 
Conformity -.097 -.597 .554 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.102 -.627 .534 
 
Group importance 
Age (months) .022 .144 .886 
Cognitive complexity -.227 -1.472 .148 
Self-esteem .221 1.470 .148 
Conformity .129 .820 .416 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.003 -.015 .988 
 
Group happiness 
Age (months) -.106 -.679 .501 
Cognitive complexity -.050 -.315 .754 
Self-esteem .150 .976 .334 
Conformity .005 .029 .977 




   
Self/Group Similarity  β t p 
Age (months) -.160 -1.010 .318 
Cognitive complexity .016 .103 .919 
Self-esteem .077 .493 .624 
Conformity -.015 -.090 .929 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.068 -.413 .682 
 
Peer Preference Bias 
Age (months) .043 .272 .787 
Cognitive complexity -.051 -.323 .748 
Self-esteem -.120 -.762 .450 
Conformity .102 .626 .534 
Theory of personality/intelligence .031 .187 .853 
 
Task competence 
Age (months) .002 .013 .990 
Cognitive complexity -.116 -.726 .471 
Self-esteem -.034 -.221 .826 
Conformity -.016 -.099 .921 
Theory of personality/intelligence -.098 -.593 .556 
 
Non-task competence  
Age (months) -.013 -.082 .935 
Cognitive complexity -.068 -.436 .664 
Self-esteem -.052 -.344 .733 
Conformity .021 .133 .895 
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